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Abstract—This paper presents a tutorial for network anomaly
detection, focusing on non-signature-based approaches. Network
traffic anomalies are unusual and significant changes in the
traffic of a network. Networks play an important role in today’s
social and economic infrastructures. The security of the network
becomes crucial, and network traffic anomaly detection consti-
tutes an important part of network security. In this paper, we
present three major approaches to non-signature-based network
detection: PCA-based, sketch-based, and signal-analysis-based.
In addition, we introduce a framework that subsumes the three
approaches and a scheme for network anomaly extraction. We
believe network anomaly detection will become more important
in the future because of the increasing importance of network
security.
Index Terms—Network security, traffic anomaly, anomaly
detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network traffic anomalies are unusual and significant
changes in the traffic of a network. Examples of anomalies
include both legitimate activities such as transient changes
in the customer demand, flash crowds, etc., and illegitimate
activities such as DDoS, port scans, virus and worms, etc.
[57]. Today, networks play an crucial role in our social and
economic infrastructures. The security of the network becomes
imperative, and network traffic anomaly detection constitutes
an important part of network security. Despite its manifest
importance, there is no good survey or tutorial papers on the
subject of network anomaly detection. We hope this paper will
remove this deficiency by providing a tutorial on network traf-
fic anomaly detection. We believe network anomaly detection
will become more important in the future and the knowledge
about it will become more useful.
There are two major approaches to network anomaly
detection: signature-based and non-signature-based. In the
signature-based approach, anomaly is detected by looking
for patterns that match signatures of known anomalies. For
example, DoS activities can be discovered based on the uni-
formity of IP addresses [44]. The limitation of this approach
is that it requires the signature to be known beforehand, and
it is not capable to detect new anomalies. In the second
approach, statistical techniques are applied to network traffic.
This approach does not require any prior knowledge about the
anomalies, and it is capable of discovering new anomalies.
This paper focuses on non-signature-based anomaly detection.
In this paper, we describe three major approaches to
non-signature-based anomaly detection: principal-component-
analysis (PCA)-based, sketch-based, and signal-analysis-
based. Comparison among approaches is difficult because of
three reasons: 1) There are many types of anomalies. Evalu-
ation studies typically focus on only a subset of anomalies,
and different studies use different data sets and focus on
different subsets of anomalies. 2) No existing method is
consistently better than the others in dealing with different
types of anomalies [46]. 3) The field is still evolving and
further optimizations are still emerging in each approach.
Generally speaking, the sketch-based approach requires less
computational complexity and storage capacity than the other
two approaches, but the other two approaches sometimes
achieve better detection performance. In section V, we provide
a framework that synthesizes the three approaches.
Today’s network anomaly detection schemes have evolved
to highly sophisticated levels, involving advanced signal pro-
cessing techniques such as PCA, sketches, time series analysis,
wavelets, Kalman filter, etc. In order for this tutorial to be
useful to readers with different backgrounds, we present the
material at two levels. At the first level, which consists of Sec-
tion II, we present the basic concepts of three representative
network anomaly detection approaches: PCA-based, sketch-
based, and wavelet-based. The first level lays out the basic
ideas underlying the main approaches to network anomaly
detection, and it does not require much background in signal
processing and thus is suitable for the nonexpert.
The remainder of the paper constitute the second level,
which is intended for the expert. The reader should have
strong background in signal processing and be prepared to be
exposed to highly advanced signal processing techniques, the
descriptions of which involve a fair amount of mathematical
formulas. Since the purpose of the tutorial is to enable the
advanced reader to implement their own network anomaly
detection schemes, we provide very detailed description for
the techniques covered in the paper. For each of three network
anomaly detection approaches, we describe a progression of
anomaly detection schemes, from the basic to the more refined,
except for the third approach where the schemes described
there are independent of each other. See Table I for an
overview of the network anomaly detection schemes described
in the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we in-
troduce the basic concepts in network anomaly detection.
Sections III, IV, and V, we introduce three approaches to
non-signature-based anomaly detection: PCA-based, sketch-
based, and signal-analysis-based. In Section VI, we describe
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2TABLE I
VARIOUS APPROACHES TO NETWORK ANOMALY DETECTION
Approaches Progression of schemes Sections in the paper References
PCA-based
The basic scheme III.A-C [37]
Using traffic feature distributions III.D [38]
Using sketch subspaces III.E [41]
Detecting small-volume, correlated anomalies III.F [51]
Distributed PCA III.G [30]
Problems and solutions with the PCA-based approach III.H [49], [10]
Sketch-based
The basic scheme IV.A-C [45]
Identifying hierarchical heavy hitters IV.D [57]
Using sketches and non-Gaussian multi-resolution statistics IV.E [19]
Signal-analysis-based
Statistics-based V.A [55]
Wavelet-based V.B [4]
Kalman-filter-based V.C [52]
Synthesis of different approaches Network anomography VI.A [58]
Anomaly extraction Using associate rule mining VI.B [9]
a framework that subsumes the three approaches and also a
scheme for anomaly extraction. We conclude in Section VII.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS
In the following, we first define network traffic anomaly and
then introduce the basic ideas of three representative network
anomaly detection approaches: PCA-based, sketch-based, and
wavelet-based.
A. Network Traffic Anomaly
Network traffic anomalies are unusual and significant
changes in the traffic of a network. These anomalies can
be changes in link traffic volume, distribution patterns of IP
source and/or destination addresses and port numbers, etc. The
causes of anomalies include both legitimate and illegitimate
activities [57]. Legitimate activities include transient changes
in the customer demand, flash crowds, routing table changes,
etc. Illegitimate activities include DDoS, port scans, virus and
worms, etc. In Figure 1, we show two examples of anomalies
of traffic volume time series data both at the origin-designation
(OD) flow level and at the link traffic level [37]. Anomaly
at OD flow level, which is not directly measurable, causes
anomaly at the link traffic level, which is measurable. The
anomalies at the OD flow level, occurring at the time instant
designated by the red dots, are quite pronounced upon visual
inspection. However, anomalies at the link traffic level are
much less pronounced visually. For example, the anomalies on
links c-d and b-c in Example 1 are hardly discernible. There-
fore, network anomaly detection is a challenging problem.
B. The PCA-Based Approach
PCA is a coordinate transformation that maps a set of
n-dimensional data points onto n new axes called principal
axes vi, i = 1, 2, ..n. The principal components have the
following properties. The first principal component points in
the direction of maximum variance of the data. The second
principal component points in the direction of maximum
variance remaining in the residue data after removing variance
already accounted by the first principal component, and so on.
Therefore, the principal components are ordered by the amount
of variance they account for. PCA is commonly used for
dimension reduction. If most of the variance of n-dimensional
data is accounted by k < n principal components, then the
dimension of the data can be reduced to k. In the following,
we describe how to apply PCA to network anomaly detection,
first based on traffic volumes and then based on traffic features
such as IP addresses and port numbers.
1) Volume-Based Detection: PCA can be used as an ef-
fective technique for detecting traffic volume anomalies as
follows [37]. The input of PCA is the m×n traffic matrix A,
where ai,j is the traffic volume on the j-th link at the i-th time
interval, m is the number of time slots in the measurement
window, and n is the number of links in the network. We
normalize A to obtain the m×n matrix X , where xi,j has zero
mean and unit variance. We apply PCA to X . Let ui denote the
projection of data onto the principal axis i. Thus, u1 captures
the most of the variance of the data, u2 the second most of
the variance, and so on. We set a certain empirical threshold
uT such that all the ui ≥ uT belong to the normal set and all
the ui < uT belong to the abnormal set. The corresponding
principal axes form the normal set of axes V1 and the abnormal
set of axes V2. We project the link traffic vector x (a certain
column of X) onto V1 and V2 to obtain x1 and x2. We
declare an anomaly if ‖x2‖2 is larger than a threshold. The
threshold is determined by the required confidence level using
the statistical test called Q-Statistics [31].
The effectiveness of PCA in network anomaly detection can
be explained by the fact that the link traffic has low effective
dimension. Figure 2 shows the link traffic variance captured
by principal components in three network scenarios. We can
see that the first 3 or 4 principal components capture most
of the variance. This low effective dimensionality of traffic
data forms the basis for the effectiveness of PCA in network
anomaly detection.
Figure 3 shows traffic projections onto the normal principal
axes (u1, u2) and anomalous principal axes (u6, u8). The
normal projections on the left capture the most variance in
the data. These time series data are quite regular and roughly
periodic, and they reflect the typical diurnal traffic patterns.
In contrast, the anomalous projects on the right exhibit abrupt
"spikes" indicative of traffic anomalies.
2) Feature-Based Detection: PCA-based network anomaly
detection can be extended beyond traffic volumes to other
3Fig. 1. Illustration of anomalies at the OD flow level (top row) and at link traffic level (lower four rows) [37].
TABLE II
TRAFFIC FEATURE DISTRIBUTIONS AFFECTED BY VARIOUS ANOMALIES
Anomaly Definition Traffic feature distributions affected
Alpha flows Large-volume point-to-point flows SIP, DIP (possibly SP, DP)
DoS Denial of service attack (distributed or single-source) SIP, DIP
Flash crowd Large volume of traffic to a single destination, typically from a large
number of sources
DIP DP
Port scan Probe to many destination ports on a small number of destination
addresses
DIP, DP
Network scan Probe to many destination addresses on a small number of destination
ports
DIP, DP
Outage events Traffic shifts because of equipment failures or maintenance SIP, DIP
Point-to-multipoint Traffic from a single source to many destinations, e.g., content
distribution
SIP, DIP
Worms Scanning by worms for vulnerable hosts, which is a special case of
network scan
DIP, DP
Fig. 2. Link traffic variance captured by principal components [37].
traffic features such as source and destination IP addresses/port
numbers [38]. In Table II, traffic feature distributions affected
by various anomalies are listed. Anomalies cause the dispersal
or concentration of traffic feature distributions. For example,
flows that have large volumes, the so-called Alpha flows,
will cause source and destination IP addresses (SIP, DIP),
and possible port numbers (SP, DP), concentrated on a few
values associated with the Alpha flows. A DoS attack will
cause a concentration of SIP and DIP on those of attackers
and victims. A flash crowd will cause a concentration of DIP
and DP on those of the flash target. A port scan will cause
a dispersed distribution on DP but a concentrated distribution
of DIP, as shown in Figure 4. In contrary, a network scan
will cause a dispersed distribution of DIP but a concentrated
distribution of DP, and so on.
The procedure of applying PCA to various traffic features
is very similar to that of applying PCA to traffic volumes. The
only difference is that, instead of the traffic volume matrix X ,
we apply PCA to an traffic feature entropy matrix H , whose
element hi,j denote the entropy of the j-th traffic feature
distribution at time instant i. Traffic feature entropy provides
an effective metric for capturing the dispersal or concentration
of traffic feature distributions. For details, the reader is referred
4Fig. 3. Traffic projections onto the normal and anomalous principal axes [37].
Fig. 4. Distribution changes caused by a port scan anomaly. Upper and lower
left: normal DP and DIP distributions. Upper right: anomalous DP distribution
is dispersed (notice the x-scale is expanded). Lower right: anomalous DIP
distribution is concentrated (notice that the y-scale is expanded) [38].
to Section III.D.
Compared with volume-based anomaly detection, feature-
based anomaly detection has two advantages. First, it can
detect anomalies with minor volume changes, such as scans
or small DoS attacks. Second, changes in feature distribution
provides useful information about the structure of anomalies
and can be used in the classification of anomalies. Figure 5
shows the effectiveness of feature-based anomaly detection in
the port scan anomaly occurring at the time indicated by the
red circle. The first two rows of the figure shows the traffic
volume distributions in bytes and packets respectively. The
anomaly is hardly detectable on the basis of traffic volume.
However, the anomaly is easily detectable on the basis of
traffic feature entropy. Since port scan concentrates on a single
DIP and is dispersed on DP so that the DIP entropy is low and
the DP entropy is high when the anomaly occurs. Finally, it
was shown in [38] that the anomalies detected using volume-
based and feature-based detections are largely disjoint, with
the former detecting anomalies that have large impact on traffic
Fig. 5. Port scan anomaly. First and second rows: traffic volume distributions
in bytes and in packets, respectively. Third and fourth rows: DIP and DP
entropy distributions, respectively [38].
volumes and the latter detecting those that have impact on
traffic feature distributions. Thus, volume-based and feature-
based anomaly detection methods are complimentary to each
other.
C. The Sketch-Based Approach
The method of change detection [2] can be used to detect
network anomaly. It works by deriving a model of normal
traffic behavior based on past traffic history and searching
for significant changes in observed behavior that deviates
from the model. The standard modeling techniques include
smoothing such as sliding window averaging, exponential
smoothing, and the Box-Jenkins ARIMA modeling [7], [8],
the details of which are given in Section IV.B. However, the
traditional change detection techniques are not scalable to a
large number of time series data typically seen in network
anomaly detection. For example, if we apply change detection
on a per-flow basis, then the total number of all possible
flows is 2(32+16)×2 = 2104, since each flow is defined by
32-bit source and destination IP addresses and 16-bit source
and destination port numbers. Obviously, we have a scalability
problem.
5The solution to the scalability problem is to use data
stream computation, which is an effective technique to process
massive data streams online [45]. Using this technique, data
is processed exactly once. One particular technique of data
stream computation is the sketch, which is a probabilistic sum-
mary method that uses random projections. Let I = I1, I2, ...
denote an input stream that arrives sequentially. Each item
Ii = (ai, ui) is composed of a key ai ∈ {0, 1, ..., u− 1}, and
an update ui ∈ R. Associated with each key ai is a signal
A[ai]. The arrival of item Ii causes an update as follows
A[ai] = A[ai] + ui. (1)
Compared to traditional data structures, sketches have the
following advantages. They are space efficient and provide
reconstruction accuracy guarantees [45].
Fig. 6. Aggregate traffic bytes for a week with no anomaly and the
high/mid/low bands [4].
Fig. 7. Aggregate traffic bytes for a week with flash crowds (two grey boxes)
and the mid/low bands [4].
In the context of network anomaly detection, we can use one
or more fields in the IP header as the key. The update can be
Fig. 8. Aggregate flow counts for a week with DoS (two grey boxes) and
the high/mid/low bands [4].
the packet size, the total number of bytes or packets in a traffic
flow, etc. The sketch-based network anomaly detection con-
sists of three steps [35]. First, we create a number of sketches
to summarize the traffic behavior. Second, we build various
forecasting models on top of the sketches. Third, we compare
the observed sketch with the forecast sketch and declare an
anomaly if the difference exceeds a certain threshold. This
sketch-based anomaly detection scheme requires a constant,
small amount of memory, and has constant update cost. The
reader is referred to Section IV for more details.
D. The Wavelet-Based Approach
A wavelet-based approach was proposed in [4] for network
anomaly detection. The wavelets provide a powerful com-
bined time-frequency characterization of the signal. The traffic
stream, sampled every 5 min, is treated as a generic signal. The
wavelet analysis decomposes the traffic into bands. The lower
bands contain low-frequency or aggregated information and
can be used to detect long-lived anomalies such as flash crowd
events that can last up to a week. In contrast, the higher bands
contain high-frequency or fine-grained information and can be
used to detect short-lived anomalies such as network attack,
failures, etc. An anomaly test is developed in [4] that is based
on the local variance of the mid and high frequency bands
of the signal. An anomaly is declared if the local variance
exceeds a certain threshold, indicating unpredictable changes
in traffic behavior.
In the following, we show some examples of using wavelets
for anomaly detection. Figure 6 shows the wavelet decompo-
sition of the traffic volume signal into high/mid/low bands.
The weekly cycle of traffic variation is clearly visible in the
low band. Figure 7 shows the wavelet decomposition of traffic
signal into mid/low bands when there are flash crowds (long-
lived heavy traffic anomaly). The anomaly is clearly visible
in the low-band due to the long-lived nature of the anomaly.
Figure 8 shows the wavelet decomposition of traffic signal
into high/mid/low bands when there are DoS attack (short-
lived heavy traffic anomaly). In contrast to flash crowds, the
6anomaly is clearly visible in the high/mid bands due to the
short-lived nature of the anormaly. For more details, the reader
is referred to Section V.B.
III. PCA-BASED APPROACHES
In this section, we first describe a basic anomaly detection
scheme using PCA in subsections A, B, and C. Then, we
introduce more refined PCA-based schemes using traffic fea-
ture distributions and sketch subspaces in subsections D and
E. In subsection F, we introduce a scheme that specializes in
detecting small-volume, correlated anomalies instead of large-
volume anomalies that other detection schemes specialize
in. In subsection G, we introduce a communication-efficient
scheme that detects anomaly in a distributed fashion. We end
the section by discussing potential problems with the PCA-
based approach and the solutions to the problems.
A. Anomaly Detection
A method based on PCA was proposed to diagnosing
network-wide traffic volume anomalies in [37], which proved
to be highly effective. This method is in contrast to much of
the prior work in anomaly detection, which focuses on single-
link traffic data. The network-wide view enables the detection
of anomalies that may be too small in the individual link to
be detectable by a single-link detector. The method separates
traffic into normal and abnormal subspaces using PCA. The
method can simultaneously achieve three objectives: 1) detect-
ing anomalies; 2) identifying the underlying origin-destination
(OD) flows that are the sources of the anomalies; and 3)
estimating the amount of traffic involved in the anomalies.
In the following, we first introduce PCA and then describe
how the three objectives are achieved.
1) PCA: PCA is a coordinate transformation that maps a
set of data points onto new axes called principal axes. PCA
requires that the input data has zero mean and unit variance.
The principal components have the following properties. The
first principal component points in the direction of maximum
variance. The second principal component points in the di-
rection of maximum variance remaining in the residue data
after removing variance already accounted by the first principal
component, and so on. Therefore, the principal components are
ordered by the amount of variance they account for. PCA can
be used for dimension reduction. If most of the variance of n-
dimensional data is accounted by k < n principal components,
then the dimension of the data can be reduced to k.
Let A denote the m×n traffic measurement matrix, where
its element ai,j is the traffic volume on the j-th link at the
i-th time interval. Let X be the normalized version of A, i.e.,
xi,j = ai,j − a¯j , and a¯j = 1
m
t∑
i=t−m+1
xi,j . (2)
We apply PCA on X , which results in n principal compo-
nents. The first principal component is the vector that points
in the direction of maximum variance in X and is given by
v1 = arg min
‖v‖=1
‖Xv‖ (3)
where ‖v‖ is the Euclidean norm of v, and ‖Xv‖ is propor-
tional to the data variance measured along the vector v. Given
the first i − 1 principal components v1, v2, ...vi−1, the i-th
principal component is given by
vi = arg min
‖v‖=1
‖X(1−
i−1∑
j=1
vjv
T
j )v‖ (4)
where the i-th principal component captures the maximum
variance in the residue after those of first i − 1 have been
removed. The vi’s are also the eigenvectors of the covariance
matrix C of X given by
C =
1
m
XTX. (5)
After the principal axes have been found, we can map the
data set onto the new axes as follows
ui =
Xvi
‖Xvi‖ i ∈ [1, n] (6)
where ui is an m-dimensional vector, and represents the
projection of data onto the principal axis i. Thus, u1 captures
the most of the variance of the data, u2 the second most of
the variance, and so on.
2) Subspace Method: The subspace method works by sep-
arating the principal axes into two sets: normal set S1 and
abnormal set S2. A threshold-based procedure can be used for
the separation. Specifically, we examine the data projection on
each axis sequentially, from u1 to un. We stop as soon as the
data projection uk+1 crosses the threshold, i.e., the projection
has a 3σ deviation from the mean. Then, the first k principal
components are classified as residing in the normal subspace,
and the last n − k principal components in the abnormal
subspace.
We decompose link measurements x into normal part x1
and abnormal part x2
x = x1 + x2. (7)
The parts x1 and x2 are given by projections onto the
normal and abnormal principal axes (v1, v2, ...vk) and
(vk+1, vk+2, ...vn), respectively, i.e.,
x1 = Px and x2 = (1− P )x (8)
where the projection matrix is given by
P = VkV
T
k (9)
where Vk is an m× k matrix composed of (v1, v2, ...vk).
We define squared prediction error SPE as
SPE = ‖x2‖2 = ‖(1− P )x‖2 (10)
and we classify network traffic as normal if
SPE ≤ σ2α (11)
where σ2α is the threshold for the SPE at the 1−α confidence
level.
A statistical test called Q-Statistics is given below [31]
σ2α = φ1(
cα
√
2φ2h20
φ1
+
φ2h0(h0 − 1)
φ21
+ 1)1/h0 (12)
7where
h0 = 1− 2φ1φ3
3φ22
, and φi =
n∑
j=k+1
λij , i = 1, 2, 3 (13)
where λj = ‖Xvj‖ is the variance captured by projecting data
on the j-th principal axis, cα is the 1−α normal quantile, with
α being the false alarm probability.
B. Anomaly Identification
We assume the set of all possible anomalies is {Fi, i =
1, 2, ...I}. For the ease of exposition, we consider one-
dimensional anomalies, and the generalization to multi-
dimensional anomalies is straight forward. We associate each
anomaly Fi with an associated unit-norm vector θi, which
defines how the anomaly adds traffic to the network. With the
anomaly, the link traffic vector is modified to
x = x1 + θifi (14)
where x1 is the normal traffic, and fi is the magnitude of the
anomaly.
We can estimate fi by minimizing the distance to the
abnormal subspace in the direction of the anomaly as follows
fˆi = arg min
fi
‖x2 − θi,2fi‖ (15)
where x2 is the abnormal traffic, and θi,2 = (1− P )θi. As a
result of the minimization, we have
fˆi = (θ
T
i,2θi,2)
−1θTi,2x2. (16)
Given Fi, the best estimate for x1,i is given by
xˆ1,i = x− θifˆi
= x− θi(θTi,2θi,2)−1θTi,2x2
= (I − θi(θTi,2θi,2)−1θTi,2(1− P ))x. (17)
The identification algorithm is as follows:
• For each anomaly Fi, compute xˆ1,i according to (17).
• Choose anomaly Fj as follows
j = arg min
i
‖(1− P )xˆ1,i‖. (18)
In [37], only the anomalies coming from a single OD flow
were considered. Thus, the set of anomalies are {Fi, i =
1, 2, ...n}, each corresponding to a particular flow.
C. Anomaly Quantification
The estimated amount in bytes of anomalous traffic con-
tributed by anomaly Fi is given by
x2 = x− xˆ1,i. (19)
For an anomaly to be detectable, it can not lie completely in
the normal subspace. That is, if (1−P )θi = 0, then anomaly
Fi is not detectable. A sufficient condition to successfully
detect anomaly is given by [20]
fi >
2δα
‖(1− P )θi‖ (20)
which basically says that the larger the projection of the
normalized anomaly onto the abnormal subspace, the easier
it is to detect.
Finally, we note that computational complexity of PCA is
O(mn2) [24], which makes it feasible for online detection.
In [37], it was shown that PCA-based diagnostic scheme out-
performs significantly other diagnostic schemes, such as the
exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) [12], [35],
and those using signal processing techniques (wavelet/Fourier
analysis) [4]. The PCA-based scheme can also be used for
other metrics, such as the number of flows and the size of
packets in the network.
D. Anomaly Detection Using Traffic Feature Distributions
In [38], the subspace method is extended to detect anoma-
lies using traffic features, such as source and destination IP
addresses (SIP, DIP), and source and destination port numbers
(SP, DP). This brings two benefits: 1) It can detect a wide range
of anomalies with high sensitivity, augmenting that of volume-
based method. 2) It enables automatic anomaly classification
based on unsupervised learning. Anomaly classification has
not been satisfactorily addressed until then, especially when
the anomalies do not cause detectable volume changes. Since
anomaly detectors proposed previously in the literature were
volume-based, no detectable volume changes meant that the
anomalies were not detectable. In the following, we first de-
scribe the extension of the subspace method to the multi-way
subspace method, which is applied to multiple traffic feature
distributions, and then we describe anomaly classification.
1) The Multi-way Subspace Method: Anomalies cause the
dispersal or concentration of traffic feature distributions ,
which can be captured by the sample entropy. Given an
empirical histogram X = (ni, i = 1, 2, ...N), where ni
indicates that traffic feature i occurred ni times in the sample,
the sample entropy is defined as
H(x) = −
N∑
i=1
(
ni
S
) log2(
ni
S
) (21)
where S =
∑N
i=1 ni is the sample size. The value of sample
entropy is in the range [0, log2N ]. The sample entropy is 0
when the distribution is maximally concentrated, i.e., there is
only one feature present. The sample entropy is log2N when
the distribution is maximally dispersed, i.e, all features appear
with the same frequency.
The multi-way subspace method is used to enable anomaly
detection across multiple features simultaneously and across
multiple flows in the network. For example, a threeway sample
entropy matrix consists elements H(t, p, k), which presents
the entropy at time t, for flow p, and of traffic feature k.
Let H(SIP ), H(DIP ), H(SP ), H(DP ) denote the entropy
matrices for source and destination IP addresses/port numbers.
Using a standard technique in multivariate statistics, the
multi-way data is recast to a single-way representation. Since
we are interested in four features, we recast H(t, p, 4) to
H(t, 4p), where we abused the notation a little by letting t, p
denote sizes of the dimensions. That is, the first p columns
of H(t, 4p) represent SIP entropy, the next p columns DIP
8entropy, the next p columns SP entropy, and the last p columns
DP entropy.
Next, we can apply standard subspace method to H(t, 4p)
by decomposing it into normal part H1 and subnormal part
H2 at time t as below
H = H1 +H2. (22)
Anomalies can be detected by testing |H2| against a threshold,
which can be determined by the desired false alarm rate, as
mentioned in the earlier subsection. Also, we can adapt single-
way subspace method for anomaly identification to multi-way
data [38].
2) Unsupervised Classification: Unsupervised classifica-
tion is used, since it can adapt to new anomalies. Specifically,
a clustering approach is used. There are two types of clustering
algorithms: partitional and hierarchical. Partitional algorithms
take a top-down approach and divide the global data into k
clusters. Hierarchical algorithms take a bottom-up approach
and meager neighbors into clusters, and smaller clusters into
larger clusters. We use two representative algorithms from
each type. Namely, the k-means algorithm from partitional
algorithms, and the hierarchical agglomerative algorithm from
hierarchical algorithms. The distance metric used is Euclidean
distance. It was shown that the results are insensitive to the
choice of algorithms [38]. The following method is used to
select the proper number of clusters. We increase the number
of clusters to the extent that intra-cluster variations reach a
minimum and inter-cluster variations reach a maximum. Thus,
adding additional cluster has marginal benefits.
Evaluations form sample data collected from two tier-1
backbone networks show that the feature-distribution-based
method provide better performance than traditional methods
such as the volume-based ones, especially when the anomalies
have low traffic volumes. One of the reasons that the multi-way
method is more effective is that some low-volume anomalies
exhibit strong simultaneous changes across multiple traffic
features, which makes the multi-way approach effective. For
example, a port scan exhibits simultaneously a dispersal in des-
tination ports and a concentration in destination IP addresses.
Before moving on to the next subsection, we mention four
related works that also use traffic feature distributions. In
[40], entropy and conditional entropy are used to provide
data partitioning and parameter setting for intrusion detection.
In [26], an anomaly detection scheme was proposed, which
works by comparing the current network traffic with a baseline
distribution. The maximum entropy technique provides a fast
and flexible approach for estimating the baseline distribution.
The anomaly detection scheme consists of two phases. In
the first phase, the baseline distribution is learned. In the
second phase, the anomaly detection is performed. In [34], the
authors extend the anomaly detection method using histograms
of traffic features. They investigate the utility of different
features, the construction of feature histograms, the modeling
and clustering algorithms, and the detection of deviations.
Compared to previous feature-based methods, their approach
constructs detailed histogram models, rather than using the
coarse approximation of the entropy-distributions. In [47],
empirical evaluations of entropy-based anomaly detection is
performed. Two classes of distributions are considerd: 1) flow-
head features: IP addresses, port numbers, and flow sizes,
2) behavioral features: the number of IP addresses each host
communicate with. The evaluations show that entropy values
of IP address and port distributions are strongly correlated and
provide very similar anomaly detection capabilities. Those of
behavioral and flow size distributions are less correlated and
often provide better anomaly detection capabilities.
E. Sketch Subspaces
In [41], the methods based on subspaces and sketches are
combined to detect anomalies with high accuracy. Sketch is a
particular technique of data stream computation, where data
is processed exactly once, and which will described in detail
in the next section. The hybrid method, called Defeat, can
also be used for identification, whereas the sketch-only-based
method can not. Defeat is based on the insight that the global
traffic sketches preserve the normal traffic variation and most
of the residual subspace. In this method, multiple sketches
of feature entropies of the global traffic are taken, to which
the subspace method is applied. Because the anomalies are
shuffled among different sketches, agreement among sketches
can be used to detect anomalies robustly.
We consider a network with n routers R1, R2, ..., Rn. Mea-
surements are performed every 5 minutes. The data consists
of netflow records D = (F, P, T ), which indicate that at time
T , there is a flow with an IP header 5-tuple F , and size of P
packets. We use m 4-universal hash functions h1, h2, ...hm to
construct sketches of size s. The 4-universal hash function is
a special case of k-universal hash function. For a k-universal
hash function, the probability that two different keys both hash
to the same value for any k hash functions is exponentially
small in k. The first 21 bits of source IP address concatenated
with the first 21 bits of destination IP address is used as hash
key. The Defeat algorithm consists of the following steps.
• Compute local sketches: Each router Ri collects the
netflow records of the traffic arriving to the network, and
constructs m sketches for each of the four features: source
and destination IP addresses (SIP and DIP), source and
destination port numbers (SP and DP). Entropy is used
to measure anomalous distributions. For each of the SIP,
DIP, SP and DP, m histogram-sketches are constructed.
For each flow j with record D = (F, P, T ), we have
k = hj(HashKey(F )). A record (SIP, P ) is added
to the SIP histogram-sketch j at the k-th entry. Similar
procedures are performed for DIP, SP and DP histogram-
sketches. We denote these four histogram-sketches as
Hi,f,j , i = 1, 2, ...n, f ∈ (SIP,DIP, SP,DP ), j =
1, 2, ...m.
• Compute global sketches: In this step, the local
histogram-sketches Hi,f,j are summed to form global
sketches Hf,j . The histogram associated with Hf,j can
be treated as an empirical distribution, whose entropy we
can compute using (21). The result is a 4×m matrix Xf,j ,
which constitutes the input to the subspace method. There
is one matrix for each combination of feature and hash
function.
9• Detect anomalies: the multi-way subspace method de-
scribed in the previous subsection is applied to each Xf,j .
The outcome is a bit vector b, whose j-th bit is 1 if
an anomaly is detected using hash function hj . Using
a voting approach, we declare an anomaly if l bits out
of the total m bits in b is 1, which makes the detection
robust to false positives.
• Identify anomalies: In this step, we want to identify the
IP flows associated with the anomaly. First, we identify
the sketch entries in Xf,j that are anomalous using the
greedy identification heuristic introduced in [38]. Then,
we determine the set of keys that were mapped to
the anomalous sketches. The intersection of these keys
identifies the anomalous IP flows.
Evaluations using traffic data from two tier-1 backbone net-
works show that Defeat provides strong detection and iden-
tification performances [41].
F. Anomaly Detection for Correlated Flows
In [51], a anomaly detection scheme called ASTUTE is
proposed to detect correlated anomalous flows. ASTUTE
has low computational complexity and is motivated by the
following facts. When there are many flows multiplexed on
a non-saturated link, the flows’ volume changes over short
periods of time have a tendency to cancel each other out
so that the average change across flows is close to zero.
This phenomena is called a short-timescale uncorrelated-traffic
equilibrium (ASTUTE). ASTUTE holds where the flows are
nearly independent to each other. ASTUTE does not hold
where there are several, potentially small, correlated flows.
These flows increase or decrease their volumes at the same
time, even when they do not share common 5-tuple features
such as IP addresses, port numbers, and protocols. Such behav-
ior is present in many types of traffic anomalies, such as port
scanning, DDoS attacks, link outages, routing changes, etc.
Compared with other anomaly detection schemes, ASTUTE
has the following three advantages:
• It doe not require a training phase, which implies
low computational complexity and immunity to data-
poisoning.
• It specializes in detecting a class of anomalies, i.e.,
strongly correlated anomalous flows, where it performs
better than other detection schemes.
• It provides information about the anomaly that can be
used in anomaly classification.
In the following, we first describe the traffic model, and then
describe anomaly detection.
1) The Traffic Model: We assume time is divided into fix-
length slots. Let xf,i denote the number of bytes in flow f
during the ith time slot. We assume that the flows traversing a
link are generated by a discrete-time market point process [17],
which determines both the flow duration and the flow volume
per time slot. Each flow f is determined by three parameters.
• sf : the slot when the flow starts.
• df : the number of slots the flow lasts.
• Xf = (xf,sf , ...xf,sf+df−1): a vector of volumes for all
the slots of the flow.
In ASTUTE, two assumptions are made.
• (A1) Flow independance: A flow’s characteristics
sf , df , Xf are independent of those of other flows.
• (A2) Stationarity: The distributions of the flow arrival
process and the marked point process do not change over
time.
There are two scenarios where flow independence does not
hold: 1) Multiple flows in the same session are correlated. 2)
Flows in a saturated link are correlated, since they share the
same queue. It has been shown that aside the two scenarios
just mentioned, the dependencies across real traffic flows are
typically very weak [3], [28]. One explanation is that most
backbone links are non-saturated as they are over-provisioned
by design. Stationarity depends on the size of the time slot.
Traffic typically exhibits non-stationarity at long timescales,
e.g., daily, weekly, etc, whereas it exhibits stationarity at short
timescales, e.g., less than an hour [13], [47]
We consider two consecutive time slots i and i+ 1. Let F
denote the set of flows active in slot i or i + 1. Let δf,i =
xf,i+1 − xf,i denote the volume change from i to i+ 1, and
let ∆i denote the set of δf,i’s for all f . We have following
result.
• (R1) If both (A1) and (A2) hold, the variables in ∆i are
zero mean, i.i.d. random variables.
The above result forms the basis for ASTUTE anomaly
detection.
2) Anomaly Detection: To detect anomalies, we use traffic
on non-saturated links in short-timescale slots. Let δˆi and σˆi
denote the sample mean and standard deviation, respectively,
i.e.,
δˆi =
|F |∑
f=1
δf,i
|F | σˆi =
√√√√ |F |∑
f=1
(δf,i − δˆi)2
(|F | − 1) . (23)
For large enough |F |, δˆi has a (1−p)-confidence interval given
by
Iδˆi = [δˆi −
zpσˆi√|F | , δˆi + zpσˆi√|F | ] (24)
where zp is the (1−p/2)-quantile of the Gaussian distribution.
We declare an anomaly if the confidence interval does not
contain zero.
In [51], ASTUTE is compared with two well know anomaly
detection schemes: Kalman filter [52] and wavelet [4]. AS-
TUTE is more effective than Kalman filter and wavelet in de-
tecting anomalies that have a large number of flows, especially
when the aggregate volume of these flows is small. ASTUTE
can detect anomalies that have one or two magnitudes fewer
packets than those detected by Kalman filter and wavelet.
However, ASTUTE performs worse than Kalman filter and
wavelet in detecting anomalies that involve a few large flows.
G. A Communication-Efficient Approximation Scheme
A communication-efficient PCA-based approximation
scheme was proposed in [30]. The scheme avoids the
expensive centralization of data processing by performing
intelligent filtering at the distributed monitors. The filtering
reduces the communications cost but can cause detection
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errors. The scheme selects the filtering parameters at local
monitors such that the errors are bounded at the user-specified
level. Thus, the network operator can explicitly balance the
tradeoff between the communications cost and the detection
accuracy. In the following, we first describe the approximation
scheme, and then describe the parameter selections.
1) The Approximation Scheme: In this scheme, there is a
set of n distributed monitors M1,M2, ...Mn, each of which
collects locally-observed time-series data. There is a cen-
tral coordinator node that collects data from the distributed
monitors and makes detection decisions about network traffic
volume anomaly. Each monitor Mi collects a new data point
xi(t) at time step t, and sends the data to the coordinator.
The coordinator maintains the data within a time window of
size m for each monitor’s data, and then organizes the data
into an m× n-dimensional matrix X . The coordinator makes
detection decisions based on X .
The monitors send descriptions of their time-series data,
and only send more measurements or summaries when the
triggering condition is met, which is given by (11). The
scheme consists of two parts: 1) the monitors process their
data and apply filtering to avoid unnecessary updates to the
coordinator; and 2) the coordinator makes global decisions and
gives feedback to the monitors based on the updates.
Let yi(t) denote the approximate representation at the
coordinator of monitor i’s data xi(t). We can consider yi(t)
as a predication of xi(t), which can be the latest xi(t) sent
by monitor i, or the value derived by some more sophisticated
estimation models [16], [32]. In the following, we describe the
protocols at the monitors and the coordinators.
The monitor protocol: The monitor Mi continuously tracks
the deviation of xi(t) from its prediction yi(t), which is given
by
ei(t) = xi(t)− yi(t) (25)
and checks the condition
|ei(t)| ≤ δi. (26)
If the condition does not hold, the monitor sends an update
to the coordinator, which includes xi(t) and an up-to-date
prediction yi(t), and sets ei(t) to zero.
The coordinator protocol: Given user-specified false alarm
probability deviation µ, the coordinator has two tasks: 1) per-
forming anomaly detection based on yi(t); and 2) computing
the filtering parameter δi for each monitor. The coordinator
keeps a perturbed version Xˆ of the global data matrix X .
The PCA at the coordinator is performed on the the perturbed
version of the covariance matrix as given below
Cˆ =
1
m
XˆT Xˆ = C + ∆. (27)
The magnitude of the perturbation matrix ∆ is determined by
the filtering parameter δi. We can bound ∆ through the control
of δi.
The coordinator protocol is as follows. Each time the
coordinator receives updates from one or more monitors, it
carries out the following:
• Creates a new row of data xˆ = [xˆ1, xˆ2, ...xˆn], where xˆi
is either the update from monitor i or the corresponding
prediction yi(t).
• Updates its global view Xˆ by replacing the oldest row
with xˆ.
• Using Xˆ , re-computes PCA, the projection matrix Pˆ , and
the threshold σˆ2α.
• Performs anomaly detection using xˆ, Pˆ , and σˆ2α; and
triggers an alarm if the following holds
‖(1− Pˆ )xˆ‖2 > σˆ2α. (28)
The algorithm is listed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithms for the Monitors and the Coordinator
Monitor Algorithm
Input: Monitor index i, local filtering parameter δi.
1: while true do
2: t := current time
3: ei(t) = xi(t)− yi(t)
4: If (|ei(t)| > δi) then send update (i, xi(t), yi(t)) to the
coordinator, and set ei(t) = 0
5: If (new filter parameter δ′i is received from the coor-
dinator) then set δi = δ′i
6: end while
Coordinator Algorithm
Input: false alarm probability deviation µ.
1: while true do
2: Make a new row of data xˆ = [xˆ1, xˆ2, ...xˆn]
3: Replace the oldest row of Xˆ using xˆ
4: for each (monitor update (i, xi(t), y′i(t))) do
5: Set local prediction yi(t) = y′i(t)
6: Set xˆi(t) = xi(t)
7: end for
8: Using Xˆ , re-compute PCA, Pˆ , and σˆ2α
9: if (‖(1− Pˆ )xˆ‖2 > σˆ2α) then trigger anomaly
10: Compute new optimal filtering parameters {δi} based
on µ, and disseminate {δi}
11: end while
2) Parameter Selections: Let α denote the false alarm
probability of using the exact scheme of (11). Let αˆ denote
the false alarm probability of the approximation scheme. The
false alarm probability deviation µ specifies the tolerance, to
which α and αˆ are allowed to differ, i.e.,
αˆ− α < µ. (29)
Let λi and λˆi, i = 1, 2, ...n denote the eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix C = 1mX
TX and its perturbed version
Cˆ = 1mXˆ
T Xˆ . For the metric of errors between two sets of
eigenvalues, we use the l2 aggregate eigen-error ∗ defined as
∗ =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(λˆi − λi)2. (30)
We proceed in two steps: 1) given µ, determine an upper
bound on ∗; 2) given ∗, determine filtering parameter δi.
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Step 1: From false alarm deviation µ to eigen-error ∗:
There is no closed-form solution for eigen-error ∗. We use
binary search to otain ∗, starting from an initial guess and then
computing our estimate for the resulting µ∗. The algorithm is
listed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Algorithms for Searching for Eigen-error
Input: Deviation µ; desired approximation factor (err) for
eigen-error.
l = 0; u = λ¯ //search range for 
1: while true do
2:  = 0.5(l + u)
3: ηZ = MonteCarloSampling()
4: µ∗ = Pr[cα − ηZ < N(0, 1) < cα], where cα is the
(1−α)-percentile of the standard normal distribution and
N(0, 1) is a standard normal random variable
5: if (µ∗ > µ) then u =  else l = 
6: end while
7: return()
Next, we describe how to estimate µ. We will use the
following random vector
Y =
φ1(‖(1− P )x‖2/φ1)h0 − φ2h0(h0 − 1)/φ21√
2φ2h20
(31)
where ho, φi are given by (13). The random vector Y nor-
malizes ‖(1 − P )‖2 and follows normal distribution [33]. To
perform detection on ‖(1−P )x‖ with false alarm probability
of α, the threshold σ2α can be obtained by a high-order
complex function of λk+1, λk+2, ...λn [31]. Based on (31), we
obtain the false alarm probability of the original PCA-based
detector as
Pr[|(1− P )‖2 > σ2α] = Pr[Y > cα] = α (32)
where cα is the (1 − α)-percentile of the standard normal
distribution.
Let Zˆ = ‖(1 − Pˆ )xˆ‖, and ηZ denote an upper bound on
‖Zˆ − Z‖. The deviation of the false alarm probability can be
expressed by
µ = Pr[cα − ηZ < N(0, 1) < cα] (33)
where N(0, 1) is a standard normal random variable. To
estimate ηZ , we use a Monte Carlo sampling technique, details
of which can be found in [29].
Step 2: From eigen-error ∗ to filtering parameter δi: Let
W denote the filtering error matrix, i.e., W = X−Xˆ . Because
of the filtering methods used, all the elements of the column
vectors Wi are bounded within the interval [−δi, δi]. The
following assumptions are made, which are standard in the
Stochastic Matrix Theory.
• The column vectors W1,W2, ...,Wn are independent and
radially symmetric m-dimensional random vectors. In
other words, their projection on a sphere is uniformly
distributed.
• For each i = 1, 2, ..., n, all elements of Wi are i.i.d.
random variables with zero mean and variance of σ2i .
Let λ¯ = 1n
∑
λˆi denote the average of the perturbed
eigenvalues of Cˆ. It can be shown that ∗ ≤  with probability
larger than 1− o(m−3) [29], with epsilon given below
 = 2
√√√√ λ¯
m
n∑
i=1
σ2i +
√√√√( 1
m
+
1
n
)
n∑
i=1
σ4i . (34)
Similar results also hold for the eigen-subspace 1−P and indi-
vidual eigenvalues. Given a tolerable eigen-error , we can use
(34) to solve for filtering parameter δi. Different techniques
can be employed to quantify the relationship between δi and
σi, which are listed below.
• Homogeneous filtering parameter allocation: the uniform
distribution method: This is a simple method that often
works well in practice. We assume the filtering parame-
ters are i.i.d. random variables, which implies σi = δ2i /3.
The filter parameters are homogeneous, i.e., σi = σ. We
can solve (34) directly and obtain
σ =
√
3λ¯n+ 3
√
m2 +mn−
√
3λ¯n√
m+ n
. (35)
• Homogeneous filtering parameter allocation: the local
variance estimation method: The assumption of uniform
distribution may be violated in some scenarios. In such
case, we can estimate local error variances δi, σ directly
from the data. We can perform the estimation by fitting a
(e.g., quadratic) function of δ using a recent window of
observations. These functions are sent to the coordinator
and plugged into (34) to solve for a new δ.
• Heterogeneous filtering parameter allocation: In this
method, local filtering parameters δ1, δ2, ...., δn can differ
from one another, and can adapt dynamically to local
stream characteristics. The message update frequency
of monitor Mi is a function fi(δi). The heterogeneous
filtering parameter allocation can be formulated as an
optimization problem as follows
Minmize
n∑
i=1
fi(δi) such that 2
√√√√ λ¯
m
n∑
i=1
σ2i /3 = 
(36)
where the second summand in (34) is omitted, since it
is typically an order of magnitude smaller than the first
one.
It was shown in [30] that using the above methods anomaly
detection can be performed with 80-90% reduction in commu-
nications cost. Moreover, the system scales gracefully as the
number of monitors is increased, and the coordinator’s input
data rate an order of magnitude more slowly than a system
that sends all monitoring data.
H. Problems and Solutions with Applying PCA for Anomaly
Detection
It has been shown that PCA is sensitive to parameter settings
[49]. Reference [10] shows that the problem with PCA is that
it does not consider temporal correlation of the data, and it
provides a solution to the problem, the details of which is
given below.
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1) Problems with the Application of PCA for Anomaly
Detection: For the application of PCA to be valid, two
conditions must hold for the data: 1) they must be linear,
i.e., they can be represented by a linear combination of
independent random variables. 2) The mean and covariance
provide sufficient statistics for the data, i.e., the mean and
covariance entirely determine the joint probability distribution.
When the two conditions are met, the most suitable basis
is the one that maximizes the variance of each projected
component, and PCA is most effective. One instance where
the two conditions hold is that the random variables are jointly
Gaussian. There are quite few examples in the literature where
PCA was applied when the two conditions were not met.
We provide a brief review of the theory of PCA here to
prepare for the discussion in the next section. Let x(t) =
{x1(t), x2(t), ...xN (t)} denote an N -dimensional vector of
zero-mean stationary stochastic processes. The random vector
x can be decomposed onto the principal axes as below
x =
N∑
i=1
uivi (37)
where v = (v1, v2, ...vN ) are the ortho-normal principal axes
of x, and u = (u1, u2, ...uN ) are principal components of x,
which are uncorrelated with each other. The principal axes vi’s
are the eigen-vectors of the covariance matrix C = E[xxT ] of
x, i.e,
Cvi = λivi. (38)
2) Extension of PCA: Let σi,j(τ) = E[xi(t)xj(t − τ)],
defined on the interval [a, b]. The multi-dimension Karhunen-
Loeve theorem [25] provides an KL expansion as described
below
xl(t) =
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=1
uli,jvi,j(t) (39)
where uli,j’s are the pairwise independent random variables
and vi,j(t)’s are the pairwise orthogonal deterministic basis.
The above equation is the equivalent to (37). The equivalent
of (38) is given by
N∑
i=1
∫ b
a
σi,kvi,j(s− t)ds = λk,jvk,j(t). (40)
The KL expansion provides an extension to the PCA. It
considers both the temporal correlation between t and t + τ
and the spatial correlation between xi and xj . Not considering
the temporal correlation would cause errors as described by
[49].
We take samples at discrete times kT for a total of K time
intervals. We assume that the covariance σi,j(τ) is negligible
for τ > JT . The Galerkin method is used to generate a set
of N × J-dimensional eigen-vectors vi,j(k) = vi,j(kT ) [36].
We obtain a discrete version of the KL expansion as below
xl(k) =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
uli,jvi,j(k). (41)
We neglect the smaller terms of the KL expansion and
obtain an approximation of Xl[k] as follows
xˆl(k) =
L∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
uli,jvi,j(k) (42)
where L < N and M < J . The above approximation has the
smallest error variance Var[X(t) − ˆX(t)] among all approx-
imations defined over an L × M -dimensional linear space.
This provides the theoretical basis for using KL expansion
as a non-parametric and generic technique to model a class
of processes, where there is no guarantee of linearity and
sufficiency of mean and variance.
The above method was evaluated using data from a medium-
sized ISP [10]. It was found the anomaly detection results are
much improved by considering the temporal correlations.
IV. SKETCH-BASED APPROACHES
In this section, we first introduce the basic anomaly de-
tection scheme using sketches in subsections A, B, and C.
In subsection D, the sketch-based scheme is extended to
detect high-volume traffic clusters. In subsection E, the sketch
method is combined with non-Gaussian multi-resolution sta-
tistical detection produces, with the former reducing data
dimensionality and the latter detecting anomaly at different
aggregation levels.
Next, we provide an overview of the sketch method.
Data stream computation is an effective technique to process
massive data streams online. Using this technique, data is
processed exactly once. A good survey paper can be found in
[45]. One particular technique of data stream computation is
the sketch, a probabilistic summary method that uses random
projections.
We use the Turnstile model [45] to describe the data stream
method. Let I = I1, I2, ... denote an input stream that arrives
sequentially. Each item Ii = (ai, ui) is composed of a key
ai ∈ {0, 1, ..., u− 1}, and an update ui ∈ R. Associated with
each key ai is a signal A[ai]. The arrival of item Ii causes an
update as follows
A[ai] = A[ai] + ui. (43)
In the context of network anomaly detection, we can use one
or more fields in the IP header as the key. The update can
be the packet size, the total number of bytes or packets in a
traffic flow. In the following, we use the destination IP address
as the key.
A sketch-based anomaly detection scheme was proposed in
[35], which consists of three modules: sketch, forecasting and
change detection. The sketch module generates a sketch to
summarize all the updates. The forecasting module generates a
forecast sketch based on the observed sketches in the past, and
also a forecast error sketch. The change detection module uses
the error sketch to detect changes. The sketch-based approach
was extended to online identification of hierarchical heavy
hitters in [57]. Details are given below.
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A. The Sketch Module
Given input stream (ai, ui), we compute a sketch corre-
sponding to key a given by
va =
∑
i∈Aa
ui, Aa = {i|ai = a}. (44)
Also, we define the second moment as
F2 =
∑
a
v2a. (45)
We use a particular variant of sketch called k-ary sketch,
which is a K × H matrix S, whose elements are sketches.
We use H hash functions. Column i of S is associated with a
4-universal hash function hi [14], [56]. As mentioned in the
previous section, the 4-universal hash function is a special
case of k-universal hash function. For a k-universal hash
function, the probability that two different keys both hash to
the same value for any k hash functions is exponentially small
in k. Different hash function uses different seeds for random
number generators. There are four basic operations for the
k-ary sketches as described below:
• Update: Similar to (43), we update the sketch S once an
item u arrives as follows
Si,hi(a) = Si,hi(a) + u,∀i. (46)
• Estimate va: We estimate va as follows
va = median
i
(va,hi) (47)
where
va,hi =
Si,hi(a) − sums/K
1− 1/K (48)
and
sums =
K∑
j=1
S0,j . (49)
The median() function returns the median among the
inputs. In other words, the hash function hi() maps the
destination IP address to a value hi(a). Then the hi(a)-
th column of matrix S is updated. It can be shown that
each va,hi is an unbiased estimator of va with variance
inversely proportional to K − 1.
• Estimate F2: We estimate F2 as follows
F2 = median
i
(F2,hi) (50)
where
F2,hi =
K
K − 1
K∑
j=1
S2i,j −
sum2s
K − 1 . (51)
Again, it can be shown that each F2,hi is an unbiased
estimator of F2 with variance inversely proportional to
K − 1.
B. The Forecasting Module
The forecasting module generates a forecast sketch Sf (t)
based on the observed sketches So in the past, which is
the sketches obtained in the previous subsection. We use six
models for the univariate time series forecasting as described
below:
• Moving Average (MA): In this model, equal weights are
assigned to all past samples. It has an integer parameter
W ≥ 1 that determines the number of past time intervals
used in the forecasting. The forecast sketch is computed
as follows
Sf (t) =
∑W
i=1 So(t− i)
W
. (52)
• S-shaped Moving Average (SMA): In this model, more
weights are given to more recent samples, and the forecast
sketch is computed as follows
Sf (t) =
∑W
i=1 wiSo(t− i)∑W
i=1 wi
. (53)
In the implementation, equal weights are given for the
most recent half of the forecasting window W , and
linearly decaying weights for the earlier half. The reader
is referred to [23] for the choices of the weights.
• Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA): In
this model, the forecast for time t is the weighted average
of the previous forecast and the current observed sample
So(t− 1), i.e.,
Sf (t) =
{
αSo(t− 1) + (1− α)Sf (t− 1) t > 2
So(1) t = 2
(54)
where α determines how many weights are given to
current and past samples.
• Non-Seasonal Holt Winters (NSHW): In this model [11],
Sf (t) is composed of two components: the smoothing
component Ss(t) and the trending component St(t) as
follows
Sf (t) = Ss(t) + St(t), (55)
Ss(t) =
{
αSo(t− 1) + (1− α)Sf (t− 1) t > 2
So(1) t = 2
(56)
St(t) =
{
β(Ss(t)− Ss(t− 1)) + (1− β)St(t− 1) t > 2
So(2)− So(1) t = 2.
(57)
• AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA):
The model is also called Box-Jenkins model [7], [8].
There are three parameters in this model: the autoregres-
sive parameter (p), the number of differencing passes (d),
and the moving average parameter (q). The model can be
described by
Zt −
q∑
i=1
MAiZt−i = et −
p∑
j=1
ARjet−i (58)
where Zt is obtained by differencing the original time
series d times, et is the forecast error at time t, MAi
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and ARj are Moving Average and AutoRegression coef-
ficients.
Typical selection of parameters is: p ≤ 2, d = 0 or
1, q ≤ 2. Here, we consider two types of ARIMA
models: ARIMA0 of the order (p ≤ 2, d = 0, q ≤ 2)
and ARIMA1 of the order (p ≤ 2, d = 1, q ≤ 2).
The choice of MAi and ARj must guarantee that the
resulting models are invertible and stationary, for which
a necessary but not sufficient condition is MAi and
ARj ∈ [−2, 2] when p, q ≤ 2.
C. The Change Detection Module
The forecast error sketch Se(t) is the difference between the
observed sketch So(t) and the forecasted sketch Sf (t), i.e.,
Se(t) = So(t)− Sf (t). (59)
Based on the estimated second moment of Se(t), an alarm
threshold RA is given by
RA = R(Fˆ2(Se(t)))
1/2 (60)
where R is a parameter to be determined by the application.
An alarm is raised if the estimated error Se(t) is above the
alarm threshold RA.
It was shown in [35] that the sketch-based anomaly de-
tection scheme can detect significant changes in massive data
streams. The scheme uses a constant, small amount of memory,
and has constant per-record update and reconstruction cost,
both of which are very desirable in streaming applications.
D. Online Identification of Hierarchical Heavy Hitters
The sketch-based approach was extended to online identifi-
cation of hierarchical heavy hitters in [57]. Heavy hitters are
high-volume traffic clusters. These traffic clusters are often
hierarchical in that they occur at different aggregation levels,
such as the ranges of IP addresses, and they are also possibly
multidimensional, i.e., they may involve a combination of
IP header fields, such as IP addresses, port numbers, and
protocols. The focus in [57] is on 1-dimensional and 2-
dimensional heavy hitters, i.e., those associated with IP source
and/or destination addresses, arguably the most important
scenarios.
A precise definition of a hierarchical heavy hitter in terms of
sketches is as follows. Let I = (ai, ui) denote the traffic input
stream, whose keys ai are drawn from a multidimensional
hierarchical domain D = D1×D2× ...×Dk, with Di having
a height of hi. The keys we use here are IP addresses, and
the values are traffic volumes in bytes. For any prefix p =
(p1, p2, ..., pk) ∈ D of the domain hierarchy, let elem(D, p)
denote the set of elements in D that are descendants of p. Let
V (D, p) =
∑
k∈elem(D,p) uk denote the total values associated
with any given prefix, S denote the total sum of values in I ,
i.e., S =
∑
i ui, and φ ∈ [0, 1] denote a threshold value. The
set of hierarchical heavy hitters is defined as
[p|V (D, p) ≥ φS]. (61)
There are two key parameters: φ and . To qualify for
heavy hitters, the threshold is φS. On the other hand, S is
the maximum amount of inaccuracy that is tolerated in the
algorithms, which is guaranteed by controlling local decision
threshold Ts called split threshold.
In the following, we first describe a baseline heavy hitter de-
tection scheme, followed by 1-dimensional and 2-dimensional
detection schemes, ending with a general n-dimensional de-
tection scheme.
1) Baseline Heavy Hitter Detection: The baseline scheme
is straightforward, but inefficient, and is used as a base-
line to evaluate hierarchical detection schemes. Essentially,
it transforms the hierarchical heavy hitter detection problem
into multiple non-hierarchical detection problems. For a k-
dimensional hierarchical detection problem with height hi in
the i-th dimension, we need to solve
∏k
i=1(hi + 1) non-
hierarchical problems. Two variants of baseline schemes are
introduced, which differ in the specific detection algorithms
used. Details can be found in [15], [43].
• Sketch based scheme: It uses count-min sketch [15].
The sketch S is composed of a K × H matrix, each
column of which is associated with a hash function hi.
Given a key, the sketch allows us to recover the value
with probabilistic bounds on recovery accuracy. It uses a
separate sketch for each prefix.
• Lossy counting-based scheme: This is a deterministic,
single-pass, sampling-based scheme [43]. Let N denote
the number of items in the input data stream. This scheme
can correctly identify all heavy hitters whose frequencies
exceed φN .
2) 1-Dimensional Heavy Hitter Detection: This scheme is
trie-based. Trie is often used in IP address lookup [54]. In this
scheme, each node of the trie has 2m children. For the ease of
exposition, we describe the algorithm using the trie that has
2 children. Each node i in the trie is associated with a prefix
p∗, which indicates the path between the root of the trie and
the node.
The trie data structure: In the data structure of trie listed in
Figure 9, array i.children contains the pointers to the children
of the node i. Field i.depth indicates the depth of node i from
the root. Field i.fringe indicates whether node i is a fringe
node. Node i is a fringe node if after its creation, we see less
than Ts amount of traffic associated with prefix p. If not, node
i is an internal node. Field i.volume records the traffic volume
associated with prefix p after node i is created and before node
i becomes an internal node. Field i.subtotal indicates the total
traffic volume for the entire subtrie rooted at node i, excluding
the amount already counted by i.volume. Fields i.miss_copy
and i.miss_split represent estimated traffic volume missed by
node i, i.e., traffic associated with prefix p but appearing before
the creation of node i. The copy_all and splitting rules are
used to calculate i.miss_copy and i.miss_split, respectively,
details of which is given below. The last four fields are used
to estimate total traffic volume associated with prefix p. We
will describe the estimation algorithms later.
Updating the trie: The trie starts with a single node associ-
ated with the zero-length prefix ∗. The volume field associated
with this node is incremented with the size of each arriving
packet. When the value in this field exceeds Ts, the node
becomes internal node and a child node is created with the
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typedef struct {
trie * child[ ];
int depth;
boolean fringe;
int volume;
int subtotal;
int miss_copy;
int miss_split;
trie; }
Fig. 9. The trie data structure
prefix 0∗ or 1∗ that the arriving packet matches. The volume
field of the child is updated by the packet size. The trie is
updated upon arrival of each new packet. The algorithm is
listed in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Updating the trie
1: i = root
2: while true do
3: if (i.fringe) then
4: if (i.volume + value < Ts) then i.volume+ =
value
5: return i.depth− 1
6: else i.fringe = false
7: if (i.depth = W ) theni.subtotal = value
8: return i.depth
9: end if
10: end if
11: else if (i.depth = W ) then i.subtotal+ = value
12: return i.depth
13: end if
14: index = getN th_bit(key, i.depth+ 1)
15: c = get_child(i.index)
16: if (c = Null) then c = create_child(i, index)
17: end if
18: n = c
19: end while
0 1
5
6 7
0 1
8 9
0
5
0 1
5
6 7
0 1
8 9
Fig. 10. An example of trie
In Figure 10, we use an example to illustrate the algorithm.
The arriving packet has a destination IP prefix of 100∗ and a
size of 5 bytes. Figure (a) depicts the trie at the time of the
packet arrival. The algorithm first performs a longest prefix
match and reaches the node associated with the prefix 10∗,
which is the node with the value 8. Suppose Ts = 10. Adding
5 bytes to the volume field of this node would make its value
larger than Ts. Thus, a new node is created that is associated
with the prefix 100∗ with a value of 5 bytes, as shown in
Figure (b).
Since the volume field of any internal node is less than Ts,
we can ensure that the maximum amount of traffic we miss
is at most S by setting Ts = S/W . The time complexity of
operations described above is on the same order of magnitude
as that of IP lookup, i.e., O(W ). For each incoming packet, we
update at most one node in the trie, and at most one new node
is created assuming the packet size is no more than Ts. At each
depth, there can be no more than S/Ts = W/ internal nodes,
otherwise the total sum over all the subtries would exceed S.
So the worst-case memory requirement is O(W 2/).
Reconstructing volumes for internal nodes: In the building-
up of the trie, each incoming packet results in at most one
update, which occurs at the node that is most specific to
the destination IP prefix of the packet. We reconstruct the
volumes of the internal node at the end of the time interval.
The reconstruction cost is amortized across the entire time
interval.
Estimating the missed traffic: Because of using Ts to guide
the construction of the trie, the volumes represented in the
internal nodes even after the reconstruction are not accurate. To
more accurately estimate the volumes, we estimate the missed
traffic, of which there are three ways as described below.
• Copy_all: The missed traffic for node i is estimated as the
sum of the total traffic seen by the ancestors of node i in
the path from the root to node i. Copy_all is conservative
in that it copies the traffic to all its descendants, which
gives an upper bound for the missed traffic. Since for
every internal node, i.volume ≤ Ts, the estimate given
by copy_all is upper bounded by depth(node i)× Ts.
• No_copy: This is the liberal extreme that assumes there
is no missed traffic.
• Splitting: The missed traffic of node i is split among all its
children, where child j receiving an amount proportional
of the traffic amount of child j. This assumes the traffic
patterns are similar before and after the creation of a
node. Both copy_all and splitting can be implemented
easily by traversing the trie in a top-down fashion.
Detecting heavy hitters: After we have an estimate of the
missed traffic, we can combine it with the traffic volume and
use the sum as input for heavy hitter detection. The accuracy
depends on the rule we used. Copy_all guarantees there is no
false negative but there can be some false positives. No_copy
is exactly the opposite. Splitting has fewer false positives than
copy_all and fewer false negatives than no_copy.
3) 2-Dimensional Heavy Hitter Detection: The detection
scheme is an adaptation of the cross-producting technique [53],
which was originally used for packet classification. The basic
idea is to perform 1-dimensional heavy hitter detection for
each of the dimensions, and to use the lengths associated
with the longest prefix match nodes in each dimension as
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indices into a data structure that holds the volumes for the
2-dimensional heavy hitters.
There are three data structures. Two tries are used to
maintain two 1-dimension information. A W ×W array H of
hash tables is used to keep track of the 2-dimensional tuples.
A tuple (p1, p2) consists of the longest matching prefix in both
dimensions. The array is indexed by the prefix lengths of the
prefixes p1 and p2. In the case of IPv4, for a 1-bit trie-based
scheme, W = 32.
Updating the data structure: When a packet arrives, we first
update the individual 1-dimensional tries, which returns the
longest matching prefix in each dimension p1 and p2 with
lengths of l1 and l2 respectively. The two lengths are used as
indices to identify the hash table Hl1,l2 , in which (p1, p2) is
used as a lookup key. The volume field associated with the key
is incremented. This process is repeated for every incoming
packet.
For each incoming packet, three update operations are
performed: one operation in each of the two 1-dimensional
tries, and one operation in at most one of the hash tables. The
memory requirement in the worst case is O(W 4/2), due to
cross-producting. In practice, the actual memory requirement
is much lower.
Reconstructing volumes for internal nodes: We add the
volume for each element in the hash tables to all its ancestors,
which can be implemented by scanning all the hash elements
twice. In the first pass, for every entry e represented by key
(p1, p2) with lengths (l1, l2), we add the volume associated
with e to its left parent represented by key (ancestor(p1), p2)
with lengths (l1− 1, l2). We start with entries with the largest
l1, ending with entries with smallest l1. In the second pass,
we add the volume to the right parent represented by key
(p1, ancestor(P2)) with lengths (l1, l2−1). This time, we start
from entries with largest l2, ending with those with smallest
l2.
Estimating the missed traffic: For each key, we traverse the
individual tries to find the prefix represented by the key, and
return the missed traffic estimate by applying either copy_all
or splitting rules. The missed traffic is then estimated as
the maximum of the two estimates from individual trie. The
maximum preserves the conservativeness of copy_all.
The cross-producting technique is efficient in time, but it
can be memory intensive. This downside can be ameliorated
by using the techniques of grid-of-tries and rectangle search
[53]. A couple of other optimizations can also be made, such
as lazy expansion, compression, etc. The techniques can also
be adapted to change detection. Results from evaluations using
real Internet traces from a tier-1 ISP indicate these techniques
are remarkably accurate and efficient in resource usage. For
details, the reader is referred to [57].
E. Anomaly Detection Using Sketches and Non-Gaussian
Multi-resolution Statistical Detection Procedures
In [19], an anomaly detection and characterization scheme
is proposed, which uses both the sketches and non-Gaussian
multi-resolution statistical detection procedures. The former
reduces the dimensionality of the data, and the latter detects
anomaly at different aggregation levels. The scheme is capa-
ble of detecting both short-lived and long-lived low-intensity
anomalies, and uses only single-link measurements.
The anomaly detection scheme consists of six steps as
described below.
• Step 1: Sketches. Sketches are taken for each time-widow
of duration T . Let (ti, xi,l, l = 1, 2, 3, 4) denote packet
arrival time, source and destination IP addresses (SIP,
DIP), and source and destination port numbers (SP, DP)
for each packet i = 1, 2, ...I . Let hn, n = 1, 2, ...N
denote independent k-universal hash functions. Let M
stands for the identical size of hash tables, Ki the
hashing key. In our case Ki = SIPi or Ki = DIPi.
The original trace (ti, xi,l) is spit onto M sub-traces
(ti,m = hn(Ki))n,m, each corresponding to a particular
hn.
• Step 2: Multi-resolution aggregation. The M sub-traces
(ti,m = hn(Ki))n,m are aggregated jointly over a range
of levels δj , j = 1, 2, ...J to form the X
n,m
δj
time series.
• Step 3: Non-Gaussian modeling. In [50], it was shown
that the marginal distribution fδ(x) of aggregated traffic
time series can be described uing Gamma laws Γαδ,βδ ,
which are non-Gaussian distributions for positive random
numbers, and which is defined by
Γα,β =
1
βΓ(α)
(
x
β
)α−1 exp (−x
β
) (62)
where Γ(·) is the Gamma function. The scale parameter
β behaves as a multiplicative factor. If x is Γα,β , then γx
is Γα,γβ . The shape parameter α determines the shape of
the distribution from a highly asymmetric stretched ex-
ponential distribution (α→ 0) to a Gaussian distribution
(α → +∞). Also, Γα,γβ distributions are stable under
addition. Let x and x′ denote two independent Γα,γβ
and Γα′,γβ random variables, then x + x′ is Γα+α′,γβ-
distributed. This is relevant in relation to the aggregation
procedure because of the following
x2δ(t) = xδ(t) + xδ(t+ δ). (63)
Therefore, if xδ can be modeled with Γαδ,βδ , then x2δ can
be modeled with Γα2δ,β2δ . Independence between xδ(t)
and xδ(t + δ) implies that αδ = α0δ and βδ = β0.
Because of the correlation between xδj (t) and xδj (t+δj),
departures of αδ and βδ from αδ = α0δ and βδ = β0 are
assured. Thus, the Gamma model combined at various
resolutions describes not only the marginal distributions
of the aggregated traffic but also its short-time statistical
time-dependencies.
Based on Xn,mδj , the corresponding set of parameters
(αn,mδj , β
n,m
δj
) are estimated by standard sample moment
procedures.
• Step 4: Reference. For each hn, the averages and vari-
ances are estimated as
αm,Rδj = 〈α
n,m
δj
〉 σ2m,α,δj = 〈〈αn,mδj 〉〉. (64)
where 〈·〉 and 〈〈·〉〉 are standard sample mean and vari-
ance estimators, computed for each m.
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• Step 5: Statistical distances. Anomalies in (αn,mδj , β
n,m
δj
)
are measured by computing the statistical distance from
the reference αm,Rδj . A number of different statistical
distances can be used [6]. Here, we use Mahalanobis
distance, which gives equal weight to all scales, and
which is given by
(Dαn,m)
2 =
1
J
J∑
j=1
(αn,mδj − α
m,R
δj
)2
σ2m,α,δj
. (65)
The anomaly is declared if the following condition holds
Dαn,m > λ (66)
where λ is the detection threshold to be selected. The
use of multi-resolution distance implies the detection is
not based on the change in traffic volume but rather on
the change in the short-time traffic correlations. Similar
procedures are used for parameter β, but a different
distance is used.
• Step 6: Anomaly identification by sketch combination.
We reverse the hashing procedure to identify the keys
associated with the anomalies. When we perform detec-
tion in the m-th output for the n-th hash function, the
corresponding attributes Ki are recorded in a detection
list Kni . We combine the N hash functions, and take
the intersection of Kni , which results in a final list of
attributes Koi that are associated with anomalies. The use
of k-universal hash function ensures that the probability
of collision in hashing diminishes exponentially fast with
N . We can verify that using k ≥ 4 and N = 8 is adequate
for good detection performance.
The anomaly detection scheme is evaluated using traffic on
a trans-Pacific transit link from 2001 to 2006. The results show
this scheme can detect a large number of known and unknown
anomalies, whose intensities are low, even down to below one
percent.
V. SIGNAL-ANALYSIS-BASED APPROACHES
In this section, we introduce three signal-analysis-based
anomaly detection schemes: a statistics-based scheme, a
wavelet-based scheme, and a hybrid scheme using filtering
and statistical methods. These three schemes are independent
of each other.
A. A Statistics-Based Anomaly Detection Scheme
In [55], statistical analysis was used to detect anomaly in
SNMP MIB data at routers. Time-series data are collected at
the regular intervals of 5 minutes. Three MIB variables at
the IP layer are used: ipIR, ipIDe and ipOR. The variable
ipIR, short for In Receives, indicates the total number of
datagrams received from all the interfaces of the router. The
variable ipIDe, short for In Delivers, represents the number
of datagrams correctly delivered to the transport layer with
this node being the destination. The variable ipOR, short for
Out Requests, indicates the number of datagrams passed from
the transport layer to be forwarded by the IP layer. These
variables are not independent. The average cross correlation
between ipIR and ipIDe is 0.08, that between ipIR and ipOR
is 0.05, and that between ipOR and ipIDe is 0.32. In the
following, we first describe the how to detect abrupt change in
a single MIB variable, then how to combine change detections
from multiple MIB variables, and finally how to design the
combination operator.
1) Abrupt Change Detection: The anomaly detection is
performed by detecting abrupt changes in the statistics of
three MIB time-series data. Abrupt changes are detected by
comparing the residuals obtained from two adjacent windows
of data called the learning L(t) and the test S(t) windows.
Residuals are obtained by imposing an autoregressive (AR)
model on the time-series data. Change detection is done by
using a hypothesis test based on the general likelihood ratio
(GLR). The GLR η for a single variable can be expressed by
[39]
η =
δˆ−NˆLL δˆ
−NˆS
S
δˆ−NˆLL δˆ
−NˆS
S + δˆ
−(NˆL+NˆL)
P
(67)
where δˆL and δˆS are the variances of the residual in the
learning and test windows. NˆL = NL − p, where p is the
order of the AR process and NL is the length of the learning
window. Similarly, NˆS = NS − p, where NS is the length of
the test window. δˆP is the pooled variance of the learning and
test windows. The anomaly indicators from individual MIB
variables are collected to form an anomaly vector φ(t), which
is a measure of the abrupt changes in the network.
2) Combining the Anomaly Vectors: The individual
anomaly vectors are combined to generate a measure of
anomaly. A linear operator A is used to incorporate the
correlations among abrupt changes in the individual MIB
variables. In particular, the quadratic functional
f(φ(t)) = φ(t)Aφ(t) (68)
is used to create a measure of anomaly, which has a range of
[0,1]. The value of 1 indicates maximum anomaly, and 0 no
anomaly.
The operator A is an M × M symmetric matrix, where
M is the number of MIB variables and is 3 in our case. A
has M real eigenvalues and M orthogonal eigenvectors. A
subset of eigenvectors corresponds to the anomalous states
in the network. Let λL and λH denote the minimum and
maximum eigenvalues corresponding to the anomalous states.
The anomaly detection problem can be formulated as
ta = inf(t : f(φ(t)) ≥ λL) (69)
where ta is the earliest time when the functional f(φ(t))
exceeds λL. We declare an anomaly if the above condition
is satisfied.
3) Design of the Operator A: First, we augment the
anomaly vector by adding the normal state φ0(t) so that all
possible network states are included. Thus the network state
vector is as follows
φ(t) = [φ0(t), φ1(t), ...φM (t)]. (70)
After the augmentation, the operator matrix A becomes (M +
1)×(M+1)-dimensional. Since the normal state is decoupled
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with the anomalous states, A is a block-diagonal matrix with
a 1× 1 upper block and M ×M lower block AM . We focus
on AM for the purpose of anomaly detection. The elements
of AM are obtained as follows
AM (i, j) = |〈φi(t), φj(t)〉| = 1
T
|
T∑
t=1
φi(t)φj(t)| (71)
which is the ensemble average of the correlation of the two
anomaly vectors estimated over a time interval T . For i = j,
we have
AM (i, i) = 1−
∑
i 6=j
A(i, j). (72)
By design, the matrix AM is symmetric, real, and its
elements are non-negative. The eigenvectors ψi of AM are
orthonormal. The state vectors φ(t) can be decomposed as a
linear combination of eigenvectors ψi as follows
φ(t) =
M∑
i=1
ciψi. (73)
The above expression provides a decomposition of the
anomaly into a number of fault modes, each represented by
the so called fault vector ψi. The operator transformation can
be expressed as
AMφ(t) =
M∑
i=1
ciλiψi. (74)
The measure of averaged anomaly E(λ) is given by
E(λ) = φ(t)φ(t) =
M∑
i=1
c2iλi. (75)
Let λmin and λmax denote the smallest and largest eigenvalues
of A. An anomaly is declared if the following holds
E(λ) > λmin. (76)
Performance evaluations carried out in [55] showed the
statistics-based method is quite effective in anomaly detection.
B. A Wavelet-Based Anomaly Detection Scheme
A wavelet-based approach was proposed in [4] for network
anomaly detection. The traffic stream, sampled every 5 min, is
treated as a generic signal. The wavelet analysis decomposes
the traffic into strata. The lower strata contain low-frequency
or aggregated information, whereas the higher strata contain
high-frequency or fine-grained information.
Wavelet analysis consists of two steps: analysis and synthe-
sis. In the analysis step, a hierarchy of strata is extracted from
the original data. It works iteratively. Given a signal x with
length N , the output is two derived signals, each with length
N/2. Each output signal is obtained by convolving x with a
filter F . One of the filters, denoted as L, has a smoothing
or averaging effect, and generates the low-frequency output
L(x). The other filters, H1, H2, ...Hm, perform the discrete
differentiation, and generate the high-frequency outputs Hi(x).
The process continues with further analysis of L(x), producing
shorter signals L2(x), H1L(x), H2L(x), ...HmL(x). In the
end, we obtain a family of signals of the form HiLj−1,
which are called wavelet coefficients. The index j indicates
the number of low-pass filtering performed on the signal. The
larger the value of j, the lower the signal is in the hierarchy.
If the original signal has a sample interval of τ , then HiLj−1
consists of data values that are 2jτ apart from each other.
In the synthesis step, the reverse is
performed. At each iteration, inputs are
Lj(x), H1L
j−1(x), H2Lj−1(x), ...HmLj−1(x), and the
output is Lj−1(x). In the end, the original signal x is
reconstructed. Sometimes, we can suppress the information
we want to ignore by zeroing the values smaller than a
threshold in the derived signals. For example, if we wish to
view only the fine-grained changes in data, we can apply
thresholding to the low-frequency strata.
In selecting filters, we need to consider the balance between
time localization and frequency localization. Time localization
can be measured by the length of the filter. Longer filters
lead to more blurring in the time domain. High-pass filters
need to be short. One measure of frequency localization is
the number of vanishing moments. We say a filter H has
k vanishing moments if Hˆ(0), Hˆ ′(0), Hˆ(k−1)(0) = 0, where
Hˆ is the Fourier transform of H . Every wavelet has at least
one vanishing moment. Longer filters have more vanishing
moments. Filters with low number of vanishing moments may
lead to large wavelet coefficients when no significant event is
occurring, resulting in false positives. Thus, we need to avoid
such filters. Another measure of frequency localization is the
approximation order of the system, the definition of which
is involved and thus is omitted here. Which measure to use
depends on the application on hand. The final factor regarding
selecting wavelet systems is artifact freeness. In some wavelet
systems, the reconstructed signal exhibits features that are not
part of the original signal but are artifacts of the filters used.
Short filters without artifacts are rare.
The wavelet system used in [4] is called PS(4.1)Type II
[18], which is a framelet system or a redundant wavelet system
where the number of high-pass filters is larger than one, i.e.,
m > 1. In the framelet system, the total number of coefficients
exceeds the total length of the original signal. Using framelets,
we can construct short filters with good frequency localization.
We use one low-pass filter L and three high-pass filters
H1, H2, H3. The high-pass filters are all 7-tap, i.e., each
having 7 non-zero coefficients. The low-pass filter is 5-tap.
The vanishing moments of the high-pass filters are 2, 3, 4,
respectively. The approximation order is 4. These filters do
not create artifacts.
The analysis proceeds as follows. It applies to the Internet
traffic data collected every 5 minutes for two months. If the
scenario is different, parameters need to be adapted.
• The L(ow frequency) part of the signal is obtained by
synthesizing all the low-frequency wavelet coefficients
from frequency levels 9 and up. The L-part of the signal
should capture long-term (several days and up) patterns
and anomalies. The L-part of the signal is sparse, and the
number of values is 0.4% of that of the original signal.
This part of the signal has a high degree of regularity.
Thus, long-term anomalies can be captured reliably.
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• The M(id frequency) part of the signal is obtained by
synthesizing the wavelet coefficients from levels 6, 7, 8.
The signal has zero mean. It should capture the daily
variations in the data. Its number of values is 3% of that
of the original signal.
• The H(igh frequency) part of the signal is obtained by
thresholding the wavelet coefficients in the first 5 levels,
and setting to zero all the coefficients in levels 6 and up.
Most of data in the H-part are small short-term variations,
which can be considered as noise. Thresholding helps to
get rid of the noise.
The anomaly detection works as follows.
• The H- and M-parts are normalized so that they have
unit variance. Then, the local variability of the H- and
M-parts is calculated by computing the variance of the
data within a moving window, the size of which depends
on the duration of anomalies we wish to capture. Let t0
denote the duration of the anomaly, and t1 the size of
the window. Ideally, we want q = t0/t1 = 1. If q is
too small, the anomaly will be blurred and lost. If q is
too large, we will be inundated with "anomalies" that are
insignificant.
• The local variability of H- and M-part of the signal
is combined using a weighted sum. The result is the
V(ariable)-part of the signal.
• Thresholding is applied to the V-signal. Anomaly detec-
tion is performed by measuring the peak height and peak
width of the V-signal.
The wavelet-based anomaly detection scheme was applied
to IP flow and SNMP data collected at the border router at
the University of Wisconsin. The results indicate that wavelet-
based detection is quite effective at exposing the details of both
ambient and anomalous traffic.
C. A Hybrid Anomaly Detection Scheme Based on Filtering
and Statistical Methods
In [52], a hybrid anomaly detection scheme based on both
filtering and statistical methods was proposed. The scheme is
composed of two steps. In the first step, Kalman filter is used
to filter out the normal traffic. In the second step, statistics-
based anomaly detection methods are applied to the residual
signal.
1) Modeling Normal Traffic: We wish to detect traffic
anomalies in the source-destination flows. Traffic volumes of
the flows are not directly observable. What are observable
(through SNMP) are link traffic statistics. The flow and link
traffic volumes are related as follows
Yt = AtXt +Nt (77)
where Yt and Xt are the vectors of link and flow traffic
volumes, respectively. The matrix At is the routing matrix,
whose element At,i,j is 1 if flow j traverses link i, and 0
otherwise. The term Nt represents the measurement noise. All
these parameters are defined at time t.
A linear state-space model is used to capture the time
evolution of the traffic of the flows as follows
Xt+1 = CtXt +Wt (78)
where Ct is the state transition matrix and Wt is the noise
process. The diagonal elements of Ct model the correlation
in time, and the non-diagonal elements model the correlation
between flows.
We assume the measurement and state noises Nt,Wt to be
uncorrelated, zero-mean, Gaussian white-noise processes with
covariance matrices Rt and Qt:
E[WiW
T
j ] =
{
Qi, if i = j
0, otherwise
E[NiN
T
j ] =
{
Ri, if i = j
0, otherwise
E[NiW
T
j ] = 0 ∀i, j. (79)
These assumptions may seem restrictive, but Kalman filters are
robust to model imprecision and deviation from Gaussianity.
Given observations Y1, Y2, ...Yt+1, the Kalman filter esti-
mates system state Xt+1 using two steps:
• Prediction: Let Xˆt|t denote the estimate of the state at
time t, given the observations up to time t. Let Pˆt|t
denote the variance of Xˆt|t. Let Xˆt+1|t denote the one
step predictor, with variance of Pˆt+1|t. The prediction is
performed as follows
Xˆt+1|t = CtXˆt|t
Pˆt+1|t = CtPˆt|tCTt +Qt (80)
• Estimation: In this step, the Kalman filter updates the
state estimate and its variance by using a combination
of the predicted values and the new observation Yt+1 as
follows
Xˆt+1|t+1 = Xˆt+1|t +Kt+1[Yt+1
−At+1Xˆt+1|t],
Pˆt+1|t+1 = (I −Kt+1At+1)Pˆt+1|t(I −Kt+1At+1)T
+Kt+1Rt+1K
T
t+1.
The new state estimate Xˆt+1|t+1 is computed using the
previous prediction Xˆt+1|t adjusted by a correction term
Kt+1[Yt+1−At+1Xˆt+1|t], of which Yt+1−At+1Xˆt+1|t =
Yt+1 − Yˆt+1 is the prediction error and Kt+1 is the
Kalman gain matrix, which is obtained by minimizing the
conditional mean-squared error E[x˜Tt+1|t+1x˜t+1|t+1|Yt]
and is given by
Kt+1 = Pt+1|tATt+1[AtPt+1|tA
T
t+1 +Rt+1]
−1. (81)
The above equations together with the initial conditions
below
Xˆ0|0 = E[X0]
Pˆ0|0 = E[(Xˆ0|0 −X0)(Xˆ0|0 −X0)T ] (82)
constitute the Kalman filter algorithm.
The estimation error, or the innovation, is the difference
between the observed value and the predicted value, and is
given by
t+1 = Yt+1 −At+1Xˆt+1|t. (83)
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The innovation is assumed to be white Gaussian noise with a
covariance matrix given by
E[t+1
T
t+1] = At+1Pt+1|tA
T
t+1 +Rt+1. (84)
We define the residual ηt+1 as
ηt+1 = Xˆt+1|t+1 − Xˆt+1|t = Kt+1t+1 (85)
The covariance of ηt+1 is given by
St+1 = E[ηt+1η
T
t+1] =
Kt+1(At+1Pt+1|tATt+1 +Rt+1)K
T
t+1. (86)
The above description of Kalman filtering is in the general
setting under non-stationary assumptions. In the following, we
assume a stationary setting where the matrices A,C,Q, and R
are constant in time and their subscripts are dropped. However,
the rest of the methodology can be easily generalized to the
non-stationary setting.
2) Analyzing Residuals: There are two sources of errors
in the residual process. One is from errors in the underlying
traffic model, whereas the other is from the anomalies. Let
Zt denote a general random process that we wish to check
for anomalies. Let Zˆt denote our prediction for the process.
Then, we have
Zt = Zˆt + ζt + ξt (87)
where ζt and ξt are the expected prediction error and the error
caused by anomalies, respectively.
We observe the residual ηt, and a non-zero residual could
indicate that an anomaly has occurred. Moreover, the residual
ηt and the estimation error ζt are correlated Gaussian pro-
cesses, and we can use one to estimate the other using the
following formula
τt
.
= ζt + ηt ' −KtAtPt|t−1S−1t ηt. (88)
3) Detecting Anomalies Using Statistical Test: We use
receiver-operation-characteristics (ROC) curves for assessing
the detection performance [21]. ROC curves provide the
benefit of presenting the tradeoffs between false positives and
false negatives over the full range of operating conditions. In
a ROC curve, the x-axis is the false positive rate, and the y-
axis is one minus the false negative rate, which is the true
positive, i.e., the probability of anomaly. The performance of
a detection scheme is considered very good if the ROC curve
rises rapidly toward the upper left corner of the graph, which
means a large portion of anomalies is detected with low false
positive rate. The quantitative measure is the area under the
curve. The larger the area, the better the performance.
Given the residual process ξt, we formulate the anomaly
detection as a hypothesis testing problem as follows
H0 : ξt = 0 (no anomaly);
H1 : ξt = µ (anomalies are detected) (89)
where µ > 0 is some constant. We compare ξt to a threshold
T0, accept H0 if ξt < T0, and accept H1 otherwise.
According to the Neyman-Pearson formulation, the goal is
to solve an optimization problem that maximizes the proba-
bility of detection while not letting the probability of false
alarm exceed a certain value α. Let PP and PN denote the
false positive and false negative probabilities, respectively.
The optimal decision threshold is the one that satisfies the
likelihood ratio test below
PP
PN
≤ T (α) (90)
where T (α) is the threshold, which is a function of α.
The ROC curve can be obtained analytically only under
simple assumptions such as ξt is Gaussian.
4) Anomaly Detectors: In the following, we describe four
anomaly detectors.
• The basic scheme using variance: We obtain τt using (88)
and declare an anomaly if the following holds
τt > Th
√
Pt+1|t+1 (91)
where Th is the threshold. This scheme is optimal if τt
is Gaussin, and suboptimal otherwise. In this scheme,
the test is performed as soon as each new observation is
obtained, so it is fast. The downside is that the detection
is made independent of past observations, which could
lead to high false positive rate.
• CUSUM and generalized likelihood ratio test: This
scheme is based on the classical approach for detecting
changes in random processes: cumulative summation
method (CUSUM) [5]. In this scheme, a change is
declared when the log-likelihood ratio of an observation
y, defined below, shifts from a negative value to a positive
one.
si = log
L1(y)
L0(y)
(92)
where L1(y) and L0(y) are successive values of the
likelihood ratio. Equivalently, the log-likelihood of N
observations, defined as SN−1 =
∑N−1
i=0 si, that was
decreasing with N , begins to increase after the change,
with the minimum Sj providing an estimate of the change
point. So, the test for change detection is the following
Sk − min
0≤j≤k
Sj > Th (93)
where Th is the threshold. The time of the change can
be estimated as
tˆc = arg min
0≤j≤k
{Sj}. (94)
Although the above CUSUM algorithm has been widely
used for anomaly detection, it has a drawback in that
it assumes the alternative hypothesis H1 is known a
priori, which is not true in many practical scenarios.
A solution to the problem is provided by the General
Likelihood Ratio Test (GLR) [27]. In GLR, the mean of
the estimation error over the window [i, i+1, ...j+N−1]
is estimated as
µˆ =
1
j +N − 1− i
j+N−1∑
l=i
τl. (95)
Then, a CUSUM test with µˆ as the level change value
is performed for change detection. It can be proved that
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GLR is the optimal estimator when the level change value
µ and the variance σ are unknown. The downside of GLR
is the increased delay caused by the fact that it needs
many observations before it can perform the test.
• Multi-scale analysis using variance: The motivation be-
hind multi-scale analysis is that anomalies appear at dif-
ferent time scales, and by monitoring multiple scales we
can reduce false positive rate since a change appearing on
only one scale will not trigger alarm. Multi-scale analysis
can be implemented by a cascade-decomposing of the
original signal τt into a low frequency approximation aLt
and a cascade of details dit as follows
τt = a
L
t
L∑
i=1
dit. (96)
where
dit =
∑
s
τs2
−iψ(2−is− t), i = 1, 2, ...L,
aiL =
∑
s
τs2
−Lφ(2−Ls− t),
(97)
where ψ(·) is a mother wavelet function and φ(·) is the
corresponding scaling function [42].
Anomaly detection is performed using a method similar
to the basic scheme using variance. For each level l,
each time instant t is assigned a bit, where 0 indicates
no anomaly and 1 indicate an anomaly is detected. By
summing across 0-1 time series, we obtain the number
of times that an anomaly was detected across all the
details signals. An anomaly is declared if it is detected
at a sufficient number of scales. This method introduces
delay due to the computation of wavelets.
• Multi-scale variance shift: This method is based on [4],
which is described in the previous section. This method
consists of two steps. In the first step, the trend of
the signal is removed using a wavelet transform. In the
second step, a small window is used to compute the
local variance. When the ratio between local variance
and the global variance exceeds a threshold, an anomaly
is declared. This method is actually a special case of
the multi-scale analysis described earlier, where only
two scales are analyzed and it detects a variation in
the variance rather than the mean. Again, due to the
computation of wavelets, this method introduces delay.
Performance evaluations performed in [52] showed the GLR
performed the best, whereas the wavelet-based method does
not perform as well.
VI. ANOMAGRAPHY AND ANOMALY EXTRACTION
In this section, we first introduce anomagraphy, which
provides a unified frame for synthesizing three major anomaly
detection approaches described earlier. Then, we describe
anomaly extraction, where the set of flows that caused the
anomalies are identified. Anomaly extraction is useful for root
cause analysis, attack mitigation, testing anomaly detectors,
etc.
A. Network Anomography
In [58], a framework and a class of algorithms were pro-
posed for anomaly inference and detection. The framework
subsumes both spatial anomaly detection schemes, such as
those based on PCA, and temporal anomaly detection schemes,
such as those based on wavelets, statistical analysis, etc. The
authors define network anomagraphy as the problem of infer-
ring anomalies from indirect measurement, since anomalies
often can not be measured directly. The name anomogra-
phy comes from combining "anomalous" with "tomography,"
which is a general approach to inference problems. A dynamic
anomography algorithm was introduced, which can effectively
track routing and traffic changes. This was the first algorithm
that can handle both missing data and routing changes.
1) Background: Network tomography is about making
inferences from indirect measurements. Examples include
inferring link performance metrics from path performance
metrics, and inferring traffic matrices from individual link load
measurements. For the latter, in a network that has m links and
n source-destination (OD) flows, there is a linear relationship
between link loads and the traffic matrices as described below
y = Ax (98)
where the m-dimensional vector y contains the link mea-
surements, the n-dimensional vector x contains OD traffic
amounts, and the m× n-dimensional matrix A is the routing
matrix, whose element ai,j indicates the fraction of traffic from
flow j loaded on link i.
To reflect the fact that the traffic of OD flows changes over
time, we rewrite the previous formula as
Y = AX (99)
where Y = [y1, y2, ...yt] is a matrix collecting link load
vectors at a time interval of 5 minutes, and X = [x1, x2, ...xt]
is a matrix collecting OD flow traffic amounts at the same time
intervals. Since we first collect link load matrix and then infer
anomalies, it is a batch-processing procedure and is called
late-inverse anomography.
2) Network Anomography: A framework of anomography
was proposed in [58], where the anomalous traffic is extracted
by transforming Y and a new set of inference problems are
formulated as
Y˜ = AX˜ (100)
where Y˜ and X˜ are the matrices of anomalous traffic and OD
flows, respectively.
Two types of transformation are described below.
• Spatial anomography: A left-multiplying matrix T is used
to transform Y : Y˜ = TY .
• Temporal anomography: A right-multiplying matrix T is
used to transform Y : Y˜ = Y T
The details of the transformations are given below.
Spatial Anomography: In spatial anomography [37], the
transformation matrix is given by
T = 1− P (101)
where P is the projection matrix given by (9). The projection
maxtrix P projects traffic onto the normal subspace, whereas
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its complement 1− P projects the traffic onto the anomalous
subspace. The above method is called spatial PCA, because
it exploits the traffic correlations among different links, i.e.,
across space. Later, we will introduce temporal PCA that
exploits traffic correlations in time.
Temporal Anomography: In temporal anomography, the
transformation matrix can be either explicit or implicit. We
consider four examples: AutoRegressive Intergraded Moving
Average (ARIMA), Fourier, Wavelet, and PCA.
i) ARIMA: Recall that there are three parameters in the
ARIMA model (Section IV): the autoregressive parameter (p),
the number of differencing passes (d), and the moving average
parameter (q). The model can be described by
yt,d −
q∑
i=1
MAiyt−i,d = et −
p∑
j=1
ARjet−j (102)
where yt,d is obtained by differencing the original time series
d times, et is the forecast error at time t, MAi and ARj are
Moving Average and AutoRegression coefficients.
We can write (102) in matrix form. We consider time series
of length t. Let I denote the t × t identity matrix, ∇ denote
the t× t back shift matrix, and U denote the t× t unit matrix,
i.e.,
I =
 1 0 0 ... 0 00 1 0 ... 0 0...
0 0 0 ... 1 0
0 0 0 ... 0 1

∇ =
 0 1 0 ... 0 00 0 1 ... 0 0...
0 0 0 ... 0 1
0 0 0 ... 0 0

U =
 1 1 1 ... 1 11 1 1 ... 1 1...
1 1 1 ... 1 1
1 1 1 ... 1 1

The differencing result yt,d is given by
yt,d =
{
y(1−∇)d, if d ≥ 1,
y(I − Ut ), if d = 0.
Equation (102) can be expressed in the matrix form as
yt,d −
q∑
i=1
MAiyt,d∇i = et −
p∑
j=1
ARjet∇j , (103)
or equivalently,
et = yt,d(1−
q∑
i=1
MAi∇i)(1−
p∑
j=1
ARj∇j)−1. (104)
Thus, the transformation matrix is given by
T = (1−
q∑
i=1
MAi∇i)(1−
p∑
j=1
ARj∇j)−1. (105)
In the ARIMA-based anomography, the forecast errors are
considered anomalous traffic. In other words, the part of the
traffic not captured by the model is considered anomalous.
ii) Fourier Analysis: For discrete-time signals x1, x2, ...xn,
its discrete Fourier transform (DFT) is given by
fk =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xie
− j2piikn , for 0 ≤ k ≤ n (106)
where fk is a complex number that represents the signal’s
projection onto the k-th harmonic frequency. For real signal,
fk is symmetric, i.e., fk = fn−k. When k is close to 0 or n,
fk corresponds to lower frequency. When k is close to n/2, fk
corresponds to higher frequency. The inverse discrete Fourier
transform (IDFT) is given by
xi =
n∑
k=1
fke
j2piki
n , for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. (107)
DFT and IDFT can be efficiently implemented by the fast
Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm with a time complexity of
O(n log n).
In general, after performing FFT on the link traffic signal,
the low frequency components represent the daily and weekly
traffic patterns, and the high frequency components represent
sudden changes in traffic pattern. The FFT-based anomography
is carried out as follows:
• Transform the link traffic Y into the frequency domain,
F = FFT(Y ), by applying FFT on each row of Y . Recall
that each row represents the time series of traffic data on
a particular link.
• Remove low frequency components, i.e., if k ≤ c or k ≥
n− c, set Fk = 0, where Fk is the k-th column of F and
c is the threshold frequency.
• Take the inverse transform back to the time domain, i.e.,
Y˜ = IFFT(F ), which corresponds to high frequency
components that are identified as anomalous link traffic.
The DFT, setting columns of F to zero, and IDFT all can be
considered as taking linear combinations of the columns of
either Y or F . Thus, we can write Y˜ = Y T .
iii) Wavelet Analysis: In Section V, we described a wavelet-
based anomaly detection scheme. Such scheme shares the
same characteristics as the FFT-based scheme in that they both
expose anomalies by filtering low frequency components, but
the wavelet-based scheme is superior in situations where the
signal contains transients, such as discontinuities and sharp
sparks. Specifically, the wavelet-based scheme decomposes
the traffic into low-, mid- and high-frequency components,
and detects the anomalies by examining the mid- and high-
frequency components as described below.
• Transform link traffic Y into different frequency compo-
nents, i.e., W = WT(Y ), by applying wavelet transform
on each row of Y .
• Remove low- and mid-frequency components in W by
setting all coefficients at frequency levels higher than c
to zero, where c is the threshold frequency level.
• Take the inverse transform, i.e., Y˜ = IWT(W ), which re-
sults in the high-frequency components that are identified
as anomalous traffic.
The procedures WT and IWT only involve linear combinations
of columns of Y and W , respectively. Thus, we can write
Y˜ = Y T .
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iv) Temporal PCA: The difference between spatial and
temporal PCAs is the following. PCA is performed on Y with
spatial PCA, i.e., Y˜ = (1−P )Y , whereas PCA is performed on
Y T with temporal PCA, i.e, Y˜ = ((1−P )Y T )T = Y (1−P )T ,
where P is the projection matrix that projects traffic into the
normal subspace.
Inference Algorithm: Given the link anomaly matrix Y˜ , we
would like to infer the OD traffic flows by solving a series of
ill-posed linear inverse problems y˜j = Ax˜j . Three algorithms
are given below, all of which handle the under-constrained
linear problems by seeking a solution that minimizes some
versions of vector norm. The lp-norm of an n-dimensional
vector x is defined as
‖x‖p = (
n∑
i=1
xpi )
1/p. (108)
i) Pseudo-Inverse Solution: The pseudo-inverse solution to
the problem y˜ = Ax˜ is given by x˜ = A−1x˜, where A−1 ≡
(ATA)−1AT is the pseudo-inverse of A, which exists even
when A is not invertible in the normal sense. It is well known
that the pseudo-inverse solution minimizes the l2-norm, i.e.,
the solution solves the following minimization problem
minimize ‖x˜‖2 subject to y˜ = Ax˜. (109)
ii) Sparsity Maximization: Typically, there are few anoma-
lies at any particular time. In other words, x˜ is sparse. Since
l0 is equal to the number of nonzero elements in a vector, we
can solve the following minimization problem to maximize
sparsity
minimize ‖x˜‖0 subject to y˜ = Ax˜. (110)
The l0-norm minimization problem is not convex and is
hard to solve. It is well known that an equivalent problem to
the l0-norm minimization is the l1-norm minimization, which
is given by
minimize ‖x˜‖1 subject to y˜ = Ax˜. (111)
In the presence of the noise, the constraint y˜ = Ax˜
does not hold exactly. In such case, we solve the following
minimization problem
minimize λ‖x˜‖1 + ‖y˜ −Ax˜‖1 (112)
where λ controls the tradeoff between the sparsity maximiza-
tion and the fit to the measurements. It can be shown that
the algorithm is not very sensitive to the choice of λ. The
above minimization problem can be cast as an equivalent linear
programming problem as below
minimize λ
∑
i
ui +
∑
j
vj
subject to y˜ = Ax˜+ z
u ≥ x˜, u ≥ −x˜
v ≥ z, v ≥ −z.
(113)
iii) Greedy Algorithm: Greedy algorithms such as orthogo-
nal matching pursuit (OMP) can be used to solve the l0-norm
minimization problem. For details, the reader is referred to
[48].
3) Dynamic Network Anomography: Previously, we have
assumed the routing matrix A is constant. In this section,
we consider dynamic routing matrices, i.e., Aj changes over
time, which reflects the normal "self-healing" behavior of the
network and should be isolated from traffic anomalies. In
addition, in practice we have to handle missing data by setting
the corresponding rows of Aj to zero.
For the transform-based methods, such as the Fourier,
wavelet, and PCA methods, the number of constraints becomes
very large as t grows, whereas the same does not grow
with the ARIMA model as t grows. Thus, we focus on the
ARIMA(p, d, q) model with d > 0, with the case of d = 0
omitted for brevity.
Our goal is to seek a solution consistent with the measure-
ments yj = Ajxj , and an ARIMA model that yields x˜ = XT ,
where T is the same matrix as given by (105). Let L denote
the back-shift operator, i.e., Lyt = yt−1. Let AR(L) denote
the AR polynomial as given by
AR(L) =
d+p∑
i=0
γiL
i ≡ (1−
p∑
i=1
ARiL
i)(1− L)d (114)
where γi is a parameter in the AR model. Let zk−i = γixk−i.
By definition we have
d+p∑
i=0
zk−i = yk,d −
p∑
i=1
ARiyk−i,d. (115)
For d ≥ 1, the ARIMA model can be written as
d+p∑
i=0
zk−i = x˜k −
p∑
i=1
MAix˜k−i. (116)
Let ck−i = γiyk−i, then the measurement equation yj = Ajxj
becomes
Ak−izk−i = ck−i. (117)
We compute x˜i iteratively by solving the following series
of minimization problems Pk for k = 1, 2, ...t:
Pk : minimize ‖x˜k‖1 subject to (116) and (117). (118)
The techniques described above were evaluated using real
traffic data from two large backbone networks [58]. Among
inference algorithms, it was found that algorithms based on
the sparsity maximization perform better than the pseudo-
inverse algorithm. It was also shown that the dynamic anomag-
raphy algorithm has few false positives and false negatives,
and suffers little performance degradation in the presence of
measurement noise, missing data, and routing changes.
B. Anomaly Extraction Using Associate Rules
In [9], an anomaly extraction scheme was proposed. In
anomaly extraction, first, anomaly detection is performed,
and then anomaly extraction is performed, where the set
of flows that caused the anomalies are identified. Anomaly
extraction is useful for root cause analysis, attack mitigation,
testing anomaly detectors, etc. The proposed anomaly extrac-
tion scheme first uses histogram-based detectors to identify
suspicious flows, and then applies association rule mining to
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TABLE III
AN EXAMPLE FREQUENT ITEM-SETS
k SIP DIP SP DP #packets #bytes support event
1 * * * * 2 * 10,407
1 * * * 25 * * 22,659
2 Host A * * 80 6 * 11,800 HTTP Proxy
2 * * * 80 6 * 35,475
2 Host B * * 80 2 * 14,477 HTTP Proxy
2 * * * 80 7 * 16,653
2 Host C * * 80 2 * 15,230 HTTP Proxy
2 * * * 80 5 * 58,304
3 * * * 80 1 48 17,212
3 * * * 80 1 48 11,833
3 * * * 80 1 1024 23,696
3 * * * 80 1 48 12,672 DoS
4 * Host D * 9022 1 48 22,537 Backscatter
5 * Host E 54545 7000 1 46 23,799 DoS
5 * Host E 45454 7000 1 46 15,627 DoS
detect anomalous flows. This scheme has the advantage of
not requiring the modeling of normal traffic using past data.
In the following, we first describe histogram-based anomaly
detection, and then describe the application of association rule
mining for anomaly extraction.
1) Histogram-Based Anomaly Detection: We consider n
histogram-based detectors, each monitoring one of traffic flow
features, such as source or destination IP addresses or port
numbers. Each histogram has m bins. A technique called
histogram cloning is used. In a traditional histogram, bins
group together adjacent values. In the histogram cloning, a
hash function is used to randomly place a value to a bin.
Each detector uses k histogram clones utilizing independent
hash functions. Histogram clones have the benefit of providing
multiple views of the network traffic.
During time interval t, the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance
between the distribution of the current interval and a reference
distribution is computed for each clone. The KL distance
measures the similarity of two probability distributions. Given
a discrete distribution q and a reference distribution p, the KL
distance is given by
D(p||q) =
m∑
i=0
pi log (pi/qi). (119)
The reference distribution used here is the distribution from
the previous measurement interval.
The first difference of the KL distance time series is
normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation of
σ. We can obtain a robust estimate of the standard deviation
σˆ from a few training intervals. We raise an alarm if the
following holds
∆tD(p||q) ≥ 3σˆ (120)
where ∆t is the time difference operator and 3σˆ is the detec-
tion threshold. Assume that an anomaly spans multiple time
intervals, the anomaly would trigger alarms at its beginning
and its end. The above procedure is performed for each feature
and for each clone.
2) Feature Value Identification: We use an iterative algo-
rithm to identify the set Bk of histogram bins and the set Vk
of feature values that are associated with the anomaly. In each
round, we select the bin i with the largest absolute distance
max |pi − qi| between the current and previous histograms.
Then, we simulate the removal of flows in bin i by setting
qi = pi. We test if ∆tD(p||q) falls below the threshold. If
not, we continue. If yes, we have identified the offending bin
and the flow feature value.
There are likely some normal feature values contained in
the anomalous bins. In order to reduce false positives, we keep
only feature values that have been identified by all histogram
clones. A normal feature value appears in all k clones with a
small probability of (1/m)k, where m is the number of bins.
3) Association Rule Mining: Association rules describe
items that occur frequently together in a data set. Formally,
a transaction T consists of a set of l items T = (e1, e2, ...el).
The disjoint subsets X,Y ∈ T define an association rule
X → Y . The support S of an association rule is the number
of transactions that contain X
⋃
Y .
Discovering association rules in a data set involves two
steps: 1) discover the frequent item-sets, which are the item-
sets that have a support above a user-specified threshold; and
2) obtain association rules from the frequent item-sets.
The motivation for using association rule mining for
anomaly extraction is that anomalous flows have similar flow
features, such as IP addresses, port numbers, or flow lengths,
since they have a common cause, such as a network failure, a
bot engine, or a DoS attack. To apply association rule mining,
each transaction T corresponds to a NetFlow record, and the
item ei corresponds to one of the seven (l = 7) flow features:
SIP, DIP, SP, DP, protocol, #packets, #bytes. For example, the
item e1 = (SP = 80) means the source port number is 80,
whereas e2 = (DP = 80) means the destination port number
is 80. A k-item set X = (e1, e2, ...ek) is a combination of k
items, where k ≤ 7.
The standard algorithm for discovering frequent item-sets
is the Apriori algorithm [1]. The algorithm is iterative and
makes at most l rounds. In round i, it computes the support of
the frequent i-item-sets. Then the i-item-sets whose supports
exceed a threshold are selected, which are used as input to
construct the (i+1)-item-sets. The algorithm stops when there
are no frequent item-set whose support exceeds the threshold.
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The Apriori algorithm is modified to output only the i-item-set
that is not a subset of a more specific (i + 1)-item-set. This
has an effect of significantly reducing the number of item-sets
to be processed by a human expert. Let I denote the final set
of k-item-sets.
An example of using Apriori to extract anomalies is pro-
vided in [9]. A 15-minute trace is used, and the threshold
is 10,000 flows. A total of 350,872 flows are flagged as
anomalies, the breakdown of which into k-item-sets is shown
in Table III, where SIP, DIP, SP, and DP stand for source
IP address, destination IP address, source port number, and
destination port number, respectively. From the table, we can
see three anomalies. First, hosts A, B, and C are HTTP proxies
that send a large amount of traffic on DP = 80. Second, the
traffic on DP = 9022 is a backscatter, since each flow has
a different SIP and a random SP. Third, some compromised
hosts are launching DDoS attack on host E at DP = 7000.
The remaining item-sets are those with common DPs and flow
sizes. These item-sets are not anomalous and can be filtered
out easily by an administrator.
Evaluation results using the data from a backbone network
show the detection cost and false positive rate are significantly
reduced by using association rules [9].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present three major approaches to non-
signature-based network detection: PCA-based, sketch-based,
and signal-analysis-based. In addition, we also introduce a
framework that subsumes the three approaches and a scheme
for network anomaly extraction. We believe network anomaly
detection will become more important in the future because
of the increasing importance of network security.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant, "Fast algorithms for mining association rules
in large databases," in Proc. of 20th International Conference on Very
Large Data Bases (VLDB), Santiago de Chile, Chile, pp. 487-499. Morgan
Kaufmann, September 12-15, 1994.
[2] H. Arsham, Time series analysis and forecasting techniques,
http://obelia.jde.aca.mmu.ac.uk/resdesgn/arsham/opre330Forecast.htm.
[3] C. Barakat, P. Thiran, G. Iannaccone, C. Diot, and P. Owezarski, "A flow-
based model for Internet backbone Traffic," in Proc. of IMW, 2002, pp.
35-47.
[4] P. Barford, J. Kline, D. Plonka, and A. Ron, "A signal analysis of network
traffic anomalies," in Proc. of Internet Measurement Workshop, 2002, pp.
71-82.
[5] M. Basseville, and I. Nikiforov, Detection of abrupt changes: theory and
application, Prentice Hall, 1993.
[6] M. Basseville, "Distance measures for signal processing and pattern
recognition," Signal Processing, Vol. 18, pp. 349U˝369, 1989.
[7] G. E. P. Box and G. M. Jenkins, Time Series Analysis, Forecasting and
Control, Holden-Day, 1976.
[8] G. E. P. Boxl, Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control, Pearson
Education, 1994.
[9] D. Brauckhoff, A. Wagner, X. Dimitropoulos, and K. Salamatian,
"Anomaly extraction in backbone networks using association rules," in
Proceedings of IMC, 2009.
[10] D. Brauckhoff, K. Salamatian, and M. May, "Applying PCA for traffic
anomaly detection: Problems and solutions," in Proc. of IEEE Infocom,
2009.
[11] P. Brockwell and R. Davis, Introduction to Time Series and Forecast-
ing,Springer, 1996.
[12] J.D. Brutlag, "Aberrant behavior detection in timeseries for network
monitoring," in Proc. of USENIX Fourteenth Systems Administration
Conference (LISA), 2000, pp. 139-146.
[13] J. Cao, W. S. Cleveland, D. Lin, and D. X. Sun, "On the nonstationarity
of Internet Traffic," in Proc. of SIGMETRICS, 2001, pp. 102-112.
[14] J. Carter and M. Wegman, "Universal classes of hash functions, " Journal
of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 18, pp. 143-154, 1979.
[15] G. Cormode and S. Muthukrishnan, "Improved data stream summaries:
The count-min sketch and its applications," Journal of Algorithms, vol.
55, no.1, 2005.
[16] G. Cormode, and M. Garoffalakis, "Sketching streams through the net:
Distributed approximate query tracking," in Proc. of ACM VLDB, 2005,
pp.13-24.
[17] D. J. Daley and D. Vere-Jones, An Introduction to the Theory of Point
Processes, Springer-Verlag, 1988.
[18] I. Daubechies, B. Han, A. Ron, and Z. Shen, "Framelets: MRA-based
constructions of wavelet frames, " Applied and Computational Harmonic
Analysis, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1-46, 2003.
[19] G. Dewaele, K. Fukuda, P. Borgnat, P. Abry, and K. Cho, "Extracting
hidden anomalies using sketch and non gaussian multiresolution statistical
detection procedures," in Proc. of ACM Workshop on Large Scale Attack
Defense (LSAD), pp. 145U˝152, New York, NY, USA, 2007.
[20] R. Dunia and S.J. Qin, "Multi-dimensional fault diagnosis using a
subspace approach," in Proc. of American Control Conference, 1997.
[21] J. Egan, Signal Detection Theory and ROC Analysis, Academic Press,
1975.
[22] F. Feather, D. Siewiorek, and R. Maxion, "Fault detection in an ethernet
network using anomaly signature matching," in Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM,
1993.
[23] S. Floyd, M. Handley, J. Padhye, and J. Widmer, "Equation-based
congestion control for unicast applications," in Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM
, August 2000.
[24] G. Golub and C.F.V. Loan, Matrix Computations, 3rd ed.,The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996.
[25] R. M. Gray and L. D. Davisson, An Introduction to Statistical Signal
Processing, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[26] Y. Gu, A. McCallum, and D. Towsley, "Detecting anomalies in network
traffic using maximum entropy estimation," in Proc. of the 5th ACM
SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Measurement, pp. 32U˝32, Berkeley,
CA, USA, 2005.
[27] D. M. Hawkins, P. Qqui, and C. W. Kang, "The changepoint model for
statistical process control," Journal of Quality Technology Vol. 35, No.
4, 2003.
[28] N. Hohn, D. Veitch, and P. Abry, "Cluster processes, a natural language
for network Traffic, IEEE Transactions on Networking, Vol. 51, No. 8,
pp.2229-2244, 2003.
[29] L. Huang, X. L. Nguyen, M. Garofalakis, J. Hellerstein, M. Jordan,
A. Joseph, and N. Taft, "Communication-efficient online detection of
network-wide anomalies," UCB Technical Report, August 2006.
[30] L. Huang, X. L. Nguyen, M. Garofalakis, J. Hellerstein, M. Jordan,
A. Joseph, and N. Taft, in "Communication-efficient online detection of
network-wide anomalies," in Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2007, pp. 134-
142.
[31] J.E. Jackson and G.S. Mudholkar, "Control procedures for residuals
associated with principal component analysis," in Technometrics, 1979,
pp. 341-349.
[32] A. Jain, E.Y. Chang, and Y.-F. Wang "Adaptive stream resource man-
agement using kalman filters," in ACM SIGMOD, 2004, pp. 11-22.
[33] D. R. Jensen and H. Solomon, "Gaussian approximation for the dis-
tribution of definite quadratic forms, J. Amer. Stat. Assoc., vol. 67, pp.
898-902, 1972.
[34] A. Kind, M. P. Stoecklin, and X. Dimitropoulos, "Histogram-based
traffic anomaly detection," IEEE Transactions on Network and Service
Management, Vol. 6, No. 2 pp. 110-121, 2009.
[35] B. Krishnamurthy, S. Sen, Y. Zhang, and Y. Chen, "Sketch-based change
detection: methods, evaluation, and applications," in Proc. of Internet
Measurement Conference, 2003, pp. 234 - 247.
[36] K. Kunisch and S. Volkwein, "Galerkin proper orthogonal decomposition
methods for a general equation in fluid dynamics," SIAM J. Numer. Anal.,
vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 492U˝515, 2002.
[37] A. Lakhina, M. Crovella, and C. Diot, "Diagnosing networkwide traffic
anomalies," SIGCOMM Computer Communications Review, vol. 34, no.
4, pp. 219-230, 2004.
[38] A. Lakhina, M. Crovella, and C. Diot, "Mining anomalies using traffic
feature distributions," in Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2005, pp. 217-
228 .
[39] W. E. Leland, M. S. Taqqu, W. Willinger, and D. V. Wilson, "On the self-
similar nature of ethernet traffic (extended version)," IEEE/ACM Trans.
Networking, vol. 2, pp. 1-15, Feb. 1994.
26
[40] W. Lee, and D Xiang, "Information-theoretic measures for anomaly
detection," in Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
p. 130, 2001.
[41] X. Li, F. Bian, M. Crovella, C. Diot, R. Govindan, G. Iannaccone, and
A. Lakhina, "Detection and identification of network anomalies using
sketch subspaces," in Proc. of ACM IMC, 2006, pp. 147-152.
[42] S. Mallat, A Wavelet Tour of Signal Processing, Academic Press, 1999.
[43] G. Manku and R. Motwani, "Approximate frequency counts over data
streams," in Proc. of International Conference on Very Large Data Bases,
2002, pp.346 - 357.
[44] D. Moore, G. Voelker, and S. Savage, "Inferring internet denial of service
activity," in Proc. of the USENIX Security Symposium, August 2001, pp.
9-22.
[45] S. Muthukrishnan, "Data streams: Algorithms and applications," 2003.
Manuscript based on invited talk from 14th SODA. Available at
http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/muthu/stream-1-1.ps.
[46] K. Nyalkalkar, S. Sinha, M. Bailey, and F. Jahanian, "A comparative
study of two network-based anomaly detection methods." in Proc. of
IEEE INFOCOM, 2011, pp. 176-180.
[47] G. Nychis, V. Sekar, D. G. Andersen, H. Kim, and H. Zhang, "An
empirical evaluation of entropy-based traffic anomaly detection," in Proc.
of the 8th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, 2008,
pp. 151-156.
[48] Y. C. Pati, R. Rezaiifar, and P. S. Krishnaprasad, "Orthogonal matching
pursuit: Recursive function approximation with applications to wavelet
decomposition," in Proc. of 27th Annual Asilomar Conference on Signals,
Systems, and Computers, 1993.
[49] H. Ringberg, A. Soule, J. Rexford, and C. Diot, "Sensitivity of PCA for
traffic anomaly detection," in SIGMETRICS, 2007.
[50] A. Scherrer, N. Larrieu, P. Owezarski, P. Borgnat, and P. Abry, "Non-
Gaussian and long memory statistical characterisations for internet traffic
with anomalies," IEEE Trans. Depend. Secur. Comput., No. 4, Vol.1, pp.
56U˝70, 2007.
[51] F. Silveira, C. Diot, N. Taft, and R. Govindan, "ASTUTE: detecting a
different class of traffic anomalies," in Proc. of the ACM SIGCOMM,
2010, pp. 267-278.
[52] A. Soule, K. Salamatian, and N. Taft, "Combining filtering and statistical
methods for anomaly detection," in Proc. of ACM IMC, 2005, pp.31-31.
[53] V. Srinivasan and G. Varghese, S. Suri, and M. Waldvogel, "Fast and
scalable layer four switching," in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, 1998, pp. 191-
202 .
[54] V. Srinivasan and G. Varghese, "Faster IP lookups using controlled prefix
expansion," in ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, vol. 26, no.1,
pp.1-10, 1998.
[55] M. Thottan and C. Ji, "Anomaly detection in IP networks," IEEE
Transactions in Signal Processing, vol. 51, no.8, pp.2191 - 2204, Aug.
2003.
[56] M. Wegman and J. Carter, "New hash functions and their use in authen-
tication and set equality," Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol.
22, pp. 265-279, 1981.
[57] Y. Zhang, S. Singh, S. Sen, N. Duffield, and C. Lund "Online identi-
fication of hierarchical heavy hitters: algorithms, evaluation, and appli-
cations," in Proc. of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet
measurement (IMC), 2004, pp.101-114.
[58] Y. Zhang, Z. Ge, A. Greenberg, and M. Roughan, "Network anomogra-
phy," in Proc. of ACM IMC, pp. 317-330, Oct., 2005.
